Delivering Hospital Services: A Greater Role for the Private Sector? by Eurofound
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
International Publications Key Workplace Documents 
2017 
Delivering Hospital Services: A Greater Role for the Private 
Sector? 
Eurofound 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Delivering Hospital Services: A Greater Role for the Private Sector? 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] This report examines the role and contribution of the private provision of hospital services (both 
for-profit and non-profit) in the European Union, with a focus on medical services. The report maps the 
extent of private provision across Europe, examines the drivers for increased private provision, describes 
how it takes place and presents the views of different stakeholders. The report also analyses the 
implications of private provision for the public sector and for the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the 
services delivered. 
The research involved contributions from Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, a literature 
review to identify studies analysing the link between hospital ownership and the services delivered, and 
six national case studies highlighting factors that influence service delivery. 
Keywords 
European Union, hospital services, medical services, private provision, public sector 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. (2017). Delivering hospital 
services: A greater role for the private sector? Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/574 
Delivering hospital services: 
A greater role for 
the private sector?
RESEARCH REPORT
Delivering hospital services:  A greater role for the private sector?

Delivering hospital services: 
A greater role for 
the private sector?
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. 
 
Freephone number*: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
*Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed.
Printed in Luxembourg 
Cover Image: Shutterstock
When citing this report, please use the following wording: 
Eurofound (2017), Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the private sector?  
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
Authors: Daniel Molinuevo, Klara Foti (Chapter 1) and Florien Kruse (Chapter 4) 
Research manager: Daniel Molinuevo
Eurofound project: Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the private sector?
Acknowledgements: Input for Chapter 3 was provided by Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, Daniel 
Molinuevo, Florien Kruse and Klara Foti. 
Input for Chapter 5 was provided by Ipsos Mori and by case study authors Daniel Molinuevo, Florien Kruse, Peter Varnai 
(Technopolis), Maike Rentel (Technopolis), Victoria Blessing (Technopolis), Giulio Zucca (KPMG) and Alexandra Bosco 
(KPMG).
Eurofound is also grateful to participants in expert workshops held on 4th November 2015 in Brussels and on 22nd 
September 2016 in Dublin, and for the extensive written feedback provided by Robert Anderson, Thomas Czypionka 
(Institute for Advanced Studies), Hans Dubois, Antonio Durán (ALLDMHEALTH SL), Hans Martens and Mathias Maucher 
(EPSU) and the authors of the case studies. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
Print ISBN 978-92-897-1564-5 doi:10.2806/09527 TJ-07-16-076-EN-C 
PDF ISBN 978-92-897-1565-2 doi:10.2806/96428 TJ-07-16-076-EN-N
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2017
For rights of translation or reproduction, applications should be made to the Director, European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Wyattville Road, Loughlinstown, Dublin D18 KP65, Ireland. 
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite European Union 
Agency, whose role is to provide knowledge in the area of social, employment and work-related policies. Eurofound was 
established in 1975 by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75, to contribute to the planning and design of better living and 
working conditions in Europe.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
Telephone: (+353 1) 204 31 00 
Email:  information@eurofound.europa.eu 
Web:  www.eurofound.europa.eu
Executive summary 1
Introduction 3
1 Concepts and definitions 5
Hospitals and hospital services 5
From public to private: Changing hospital forms 5
Privatisation, liberalisation and marketisation 6
Service delivery dimensions: Efficiency, accessibility and quality 6
2 Overview of the methodology 13
National overview of private provision 13
Literature review 14
Country case studies 14
3 Private provision of hospital services 19
Drivers of private provision 19
Impact on budgets and costs 25
Views on private provision of hospital services 26
4 Main findings of the literature review 29
Prior research: Systematic reviews 29
Synthesis 30
Discussion 35
5 Evidence from the country case studies 37
Efficiency 37
Accessibility 40
Quality and monitoring 42
Cross-cutting issues 44
6 Conclusions 47
Efficiency 47
Accessibility 48
Quality 48
Policy pointers 49
References 51
Annex: REA methodology 59
Contents
Abbreviations used in the report
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis
DRG Diagnostic Related Group
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISTC Independent Sector Treatment Centre
NHS National Health Service (United Kingdom)
OMC Open Method of Coordination
PFI private finance initiative
PPP public–private partnership
QALY quality-adjusted life year
REA rapid evidence assessment
SFA Stochastic Frontier Analysis
1Executive summary
Introduction
This report examines the role and contribution of the 
private provision of hospital services (both for-profit and 
non-profit) in the European Union, with a focus on medical 
services. The report maps the extent of private provision 
across Europe, examines the drivers for increased private 
provision, describes how it takes place and presents the 
views of different stakeholders. The report also analyses 
the implications of private provision for the public sector 
and for the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the 
services delivered.
The research involved contributions from Eurofound’s 
network of European correspondents, a literature review 
to identify studies analysing the link between hospital 
ownership and the services delivered, and six national 
case studies highlighting factors that influence service 
delivery.
Policy context
Healthcare reforms have attracted increasing attention 
in the EU's economic monitoring system, the European 
Semester, with 11 Member States receiving country-
specific recommendations in 2016, mostly concerned with 
increasing cost-effectiveness and improving accessibility. 
Ensuring access to high quality healthcare is one of the key 
elements of the European Pillar of Social Rights.
An Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health 
was set up in 2012 to provide scientific advice in areas such 
as commissioning from private providers, competition 
among providers of healthcare services and public–private 
partnerships (PPPs). The Social Investment Package, 
presented in 2013, included a Commission Staff Working 
Document that set out the role of the EU in healthcare. 
Also in 2013, the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF) 
indicators methodology for health was piloted.
Key findings
Trends in private provision
The past 10 years have seen an increase in private for-
profit hospitals and their number of beds in most Member 
States (for which data are available), in particular in 
Bulgaria and Romania. These hospitals tend to be small 
and offer fewer types of treatment than public ones. Non-
profit provision fell during this period (in all countries for 
which data are available), with the exception of Italy and 
Portugal.
This increase in for-profit provision has taken place in the 
context of a decrease in the number of public hospitals 
and the number of their beds. The economic and financial 
crisis accelerated the process in some Member States, with 
the closure of public hospitals creating new opportunities 
for private providers.
A precursor to this increase in private provision was 
the introduction of competition and market-oriented 
mechanisms that create opportunities for profit. Policies 
that favour the role of private providers and which aim 
to diminish the role of the public sector tend to have, as 
their rationale, gains in efficiency and a reduction in public 
expenditure and waiting lists in public hospitals.
Forms of privatisation
Corporatisation (the change of legal status of public 
hospitals to become companies under private law) has 
been used in Poland as way to reduce local authority debt 
and in the UK to give hospitals more autonomy.
Outsourcing has been used in many countries, mostly 
in relation to non-medical activities such as catering, 
cleaning and security. Some of the health-related services 
that have been outsourced include laboratory testing and 
diagnostic services, sterilisation of medical instruments 
and routine elective surgery.
PPPs have been established mostly for hospital 
construction, renovation and building alterations, but they 
have also been used for the management and delivery of 
services, mainly in western Europe. There are few PPPs in 
central and eastern Europe.
The full or partial sale of public hospitals is an uncommon 
process in most of the countries analysed, with some 
having cancelled privatisation plans due to public 
opposition.
Implications for service delivery
No conclusive evidence was found on which type of 
hospital is more efficient; the incentives provided by 
reimbursement mechanisms have a major influence on the 
efficiency of all types of hospitals. Several studies highlight 
the influence of staff and work processes on technical 
efficiency; offering fewer types of treatment than public 
hospitals allows private hospitals to standardise processes 
more efficiently.
Studies in some of the countries where care has been 
purchased from private hospitals with the aim of reducing 
waiting lists in public hospitals (Ireland and the UK) 
show it is not entirely clear whether this strategy has 
been successful, or whether it is more cost-effective than 
investing in developing the capacity of public hospitals.
Patients in private hospitals usually have conditions 
requiring treatments that are more profitable than those 
provided in public hospitals. There are also differences in 
the age, socioeconomic status and insurance coverage of 
patients in public and private hospitals. Patients in private 
hospitals with complications tend to be transferred to 
public hospitals.
The availability and coordination with other levels of 
healthcare and social services are additional factors 
influencing access to hospitals. The reluctance of doctors 
to refer patients is one of the reasons the purchase of 
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care from private hospitals has not been fully availed of in 
Ireland and the UK.
The studies identified by the literature review did not 
find a clear relationship between the type of hospital 
ownership and the quality of care provided. Comparing 
or evaluating the care outcomes of patients with different 
levels of complexity is difficult. This is partly due to data 
about the quality of care in private hospitals not being 
publicly available in several countries.
Policy pointers
 The debate about the relative merits of public or 
private provision is complex and demands careful 
framing, given the differences between public and 
private hospitals, and because service delivery is 
influenced by factors such as the types of services 
offered and the reimbursement mechanisms.
 Unscheduled transfers of patients with complications 
to public hospitals could be avoided by having 
agreements between public and private hospitals.
 Private hospitals can contribute towards the reduction 
of waiting lists in public hospitals. Having a more 
structured relationship between public and private 
hospitals than on-the-spot contracting, could reduce 
the selection of more profitable patients and the 
referral of unscheduled complex cases to public 
hospitals. Greater coordination of information on 
patients and staff is required. The public sector can act 
as a broker, establishing a repository of information, 
complaints and good practices to which both public 
and private hospitals contribute.
 The availability of home and residential care services 
has an impact on the accessibility of hospitals, as it 
reduces the occupation of beds by patients unable to 
be discharged due to a lack of suitable care elsewhere.
 There is a need for more robust research comparing 
the accessibility and cost efficiency of public and 
private hospitals. There should also be regulation and 
incentives in place for private hospitals to make data 
available about access and quality outcomes.
3Introduction
This report brings together the findings of the research 
project ‘Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the 
private sector?’, carried out by Eurofound in 2015 and 2016, 
and continues the work started in an exploratory project 
that examined the role of the private providers in different 
social and health services and its implications for service 
delivery (Eurofound, 2015a).
This report focuses on private hospital services, both for-
profit and non-profit. The research questions addressed 
are:
 To what extent and in which areas are private 
providers expanding and/or replacing the public 
sector in the delivery of services in hospitals?
 What are the consequences of higher private sector 
involvement for the quality, accessibility and 
efficiency of services?
This report aims to describe private provision across Europe 
and to analyse the influence of hospital ownership on 
service delivery. It also contains recommendations on how 
healthcare reforms can maximise the advantages of private 
provision while avoiding problems associated with it.
Private hospitals (as a sector) are analysed in their role as 
service providers. Therefore, the sector’s financing role 
is described only by explaining how it has affected the 
care provided. For example, when describing PPPs where 
the private sector has only a financing role, these are 
described in terms of how the partnership has affected the 
services delivered.
Although the focus of the report is mainly on health 
related services, such as chronic and acute care, inpatient 
and outpatient, laboratory services and diagnostic testing, 
changes in the provision of non-medical services such as 
laundry, catering, cleaning, security and administrative 
services are also reported in the overview of developments 
in selected Member States.
EU policy context
Although Article 152 of the European Commision Treaty 
(previously Article 129) gives very limited competence 
to the European Union to legislate on health policy, the 
EU is ‘entering national healthcare systems by the back 
door of the internal market’ (Hervey and Vanhercke, 2010, 
p. 116). Since 2004, healthcare and long-term care have 
also been addressed through ‘soft law’ governance when 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)1 was extended 
to healthcare and long-term care with the aim of having 
a common framework for the reform and development 
of services (European Commission, 2004). Furthermore, 
Article 2e of the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 
2007) gives competences to the EU to carry out actions 
to support, coordinate and supplement the actions of 
Member States. EU action is foreseen, in particular, on 
cooperation in cross-border areas and the exchange of 
good practices. The Treaty of Lisbon also states that the 
EU shall respect the responsibility of Member States 
in defining their health policy as well as organising, 
managing and delivering health services.
These actions are taking place within the framework 
of EU economic governance (known as the European 
Semester), with the European Commission providing 
recommendations on health system reforms as part 
of its Annual Growth Surveys. These have made the 
modernisation of public administration one of its priorities 
since 2012. The Annual Growth Survey in 2016 (European 
Commission 2015a) called for a continuation of reforms 
to make healthcare more cost-effective and to ensure 
adequate access, together with modernisation in the areas 
of provision and financing. Implementation measures 
at the national level are reported by Member States in 
their national reform programmes, which are used by the 
European Commission for monitoring and issuing country-
specific recommendations. The number of country-specific 
recommendations in the field of healthcare increased 
from 5 in 2013 to 11 in 2014. In 2016, 11 countries received 
recommendations about healthcare, focusing mainly on 
increasing cost-effectiveness (see Box 1).
1 OMC promotes the mutual learning and the comparison of the performance of Member States in several areas of health and social protection.
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Box 1: Country-specific recommendations on healthcare, 2016
Bulgaria: ‘Improve the efficiency of the health system by improving access and funding, and health outcomes’.
Cyprus: ‘Adopt legislation for a hospital reform and advance with the planned implementation of universal healthcare 
coverage’.
Czech Republic: ‘Take measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances in light of future risks in the 
area of healthcare’.
Finland: ‘Ensure timely adoption and implementation of the administrative reform with a view to better cost-
effectiveness of social and healthcare services’.
Ireland: ‘Enhance the quality of expenditure, particularly by increasing cost-effectiveness of healthcare’.
Italy: ‘Take further action to increase competition in regulated professions, the transport, health and retail sectors and 
the system of concessions’.
Latvia: ‘Improve the accessibility, quality and cost-effectiveness of the healthcare system’.
Lithuania: ‘Improve the performance of the healthcare system by strengthening outpatient care, disease prevention and 
health promotion’.
Portugal: ‘Ensure the long-term sustainability of the health sector without compromising access to primary healthcare’.
Slovakia: ‘Improve the cost-effectiveness of the healthcare system’.
Slovenia: ‘Complete and implement the reform of the long-term care and healthcare systems, making them more cost 
efficient to ensure long-term sustainability of accessible and quality care’.
Source: European Commission Country-specific Recommendations, 2016.
Reforming healthcare is also one of the key messages 
in the Commission Staff Working Document Investing in 
health (European Commission, 2013a). This is part of the 
Social Investment Package and sets out the role of the EU 
in healthcare and how it supports the Europe 2020 goal of 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The document 
calls for efficiency gains in healthcare in order to contain 
costs, to ensure its sustainability and to reconcile it with 
fiscal consolidation goals. Some of the proposed measures 
include introducing activity and/or quality-based payment 
for Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) and developing tools 
to better assess the efficiency of healthcare systems.
The Commission also supported these reforms in 2012 by 
setting up an Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in 
Health. This panel provides scientific advice in areas such 
as commissioning from private providers, competition 
among providers of healthcare services and PPPs. In 2013, 
the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF)2 methodology was 
piloted in healthcare to support the work of the Social 
Protection Committee and the European Commission in 
the OMC and the European Semester.
As well as the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of 
healthcare, its accessibility features prominently in the 
European policy agenda. A Communication in 2009 on 
health inequalities (European Commission, 2009), set 
out actions aimed at tackling this issue, which included 
providing information about funding, assessing the impact 
of EU policies and cooperation with Member States. The 
Cross-Border Healthcare Directive (European Parliament 
and Council, 2011) clarifies the rules and reimbursement 
for healthcare received in another country.
Ensuring access to high quality healthcare is also one 
of the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
which is to become a reference framework to screen 
reforms at national level within the euro zone (as well 
as in other Member States that may wish to join). The 
preliminary outline of the Social Pillar highlights the 
need for affordable and timely healthcare, as stated in 
Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European 
Parliament, 2000). It also draws attention to the need for 
the cost-effective provision and financial sustainability of 
care mentioned in the Social Investment Package.
2 The Joint Assessment Framework was developed by the European Commission and the Social Protection and Employment Committees in 2010 to monitor 
progress towards Europe 2020 goals on the basis of commonly agreed indicators.
51 Concepts and definitions
This chapter explains the concepts used in the report and 
briefly discusses their main elements. It can be difficult to 
explain and operationalise the concept of privatisation. 
Not only can the use of the correct terminology prove 
difficult, as various terms cover similar processes 
(liberalisation, marketisation and (re)commodification), 
but also the boundaries between public and private 
service provision are becoming increasingly blurred 
(Sirovátka et al, 2011, p. 49). In addition, in order to clarify 
privatisation as a concept, the notion of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ first needs to be defined. For example, within the 
context of healthcare (including hospital care), it could 
be questioned whether purely private agents really exist 
‘because they are always embedded in a system of public 
regulation that determines the scope for private activity’ 
(Maarse, 2006, p. 984).
National conventions also influence the meaning of public 
and private, which adds to the challenge, especially 
in a cross-country comparison. In the Netherlands, 
for example, health services are regarded as private 
activities if they are excluded from public funding (Maarse, 
2006, p. 985). Moreover, privatisation appears in many 
forms; from the sale of public hospitals to, for example, 
outsourcing, change of legal status and PPPs.
Another challenge, which makes cross-country comparisons 
particularly difficult, is that these processes cannot be 
measured in an exact way (Hermann and Verhoest, 2012, 
p. 13). Within this context, qualitative studies are of specific 
importance. They not only provide valuable contextual 
information within each country, but by the careful 
selection of case studies they can also explore issues which 
seem of particular relevance to the topic.
Hospitals and hospital services
The definition of hospital services used in the current 
project is the one established in the System of Health 
Accounts used by OECD, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and Eurostat:
Hospitals comprise licensed establishments that are 
primarily engaged in providing medical, diagnostic and 
treatment services that include physician, nursing and 
other health services to inpatients and the specialised 
accommodation services required by inpatients. 
Hospitals provide inpatient health services, many 
of which can be delivered only by using specialised 
facilities and professional knowledge as well as 
advanced medical technology and equipment, which 
form a significant and integral part of the provision 
process. Although the principal activity is the provision of 
inpatient medical care they may also provide day care, 
outpatient and home health care services as secondary 
activities.
(OECD et al, 2011, p. 131)
Where relevant, the report aims to place hospitals and 
hospital services within the broader context of healthcare. 
Within hospital services, this project looks only at clinical 
services, although when outsourcing is discussed, it also 
provides some information on non-clinical services such 
as cleaning, catering and laundry.
The report is mostly concerned with medical services, but 
it also discusses non-medical, health-related services such 
as laboratory services and diagnostic testing, due to the 
importance of the role in the private sector.
From public to private: Changing 
hospital forms
The following four types of hospital can be linked to 
privatisation:3
 Public sector autonomous hospitals: The government 
retains ownership of the hospital but gives some 
autonomy to the hospital management. The hospital 
can have independent legal status so that it can 
enter into contracts with a health insurance fund, 
for example National Health Service trusts in the UK. 
Similar models existed in central and eastern Europe, 
especially during the transition period, when the 
process of ‘corporatisation’ occurred.
 Private management of publicly owned hospitals: 
Examples of this form are found in Portugal – the State 
retains ownership, but the management of the facility 
is contracted to private companies.
 Private for-profit hospitals: Their importance is 
shown by the fact that 20% of all hospital capacities 
are covered by this type in France, Germany, Portugal 
and Spain (Busse and Wörz, 2002).
 Private non-profit hospitals: These are private 
hospitals without a profit objective, which includes 
hospitals operating under the ideology of religious or 
community missions. The hospitals receive funding 
through public channels and are commonly found in 
countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK (Saltman et al, 2011). 
This type of hospital can also be found in eastern 
Europe (for example, in Hungary).
This is not a comprehensive list and is based on categories 
of hospital ownership. Since this research focuses on 
provision, the categories selected are those which could be 
of relevance and have implications for delivery.
Not surprisingly, privatisation has led to major 
organisational transformation in hospitals, mostly 
driven by the new forms outlined above. However, the 
organisational restructuring was not always linked directly 
to these forms of privatisation. As part of marketisation, 
internal markets were created within hospitals, where 
3 Based on McKee and Healy (2002, Box 7.1, p. 122).
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departments were transformed to separate cost centres 
(Schulten and Böhlke, 2012, pp. 90–95).
Privatisation, liberalisation and 
marketisation
The term ‘privatisation’ refers to transformation from 
the public to the private sphere (Frangakis et al, 2009, 
p. 2). However, the increase in private sector provision 
in the hospital sector does not only include the process 
of privatisation, but also the emergence of new private 
hospitals. This development can be linked to general 
trends in the past decade: the State transforming from 
a ‘provider state’ to a ‘guarantor or enabling state’ (Huber 
et al, 2008), in that it is ‘more market and less state’ 
(Gilbert, 2005) provision of services across the EU. The 
same process can also be observed within healthcare 
reforms.
Within the context of hospitals, the distinction between 
marketisation, liberalisation and privatisation it is 
necessary to understand the process of transformation 
and how and in what forms private players became 
increasingly involved in hospital services. Maarse (2006, 
p. 988.) also emphasises the ‘evolutionary character’ of 
privatisation, arguing for the introduction of ‘the notion 
of a continuum, ranging from precursors of privatisation 
to moderate forms of privatisation to radical forms of 
privatisation’ (Maarse, 2006, p. 988).
At the same time, the distinction – especially between 
marketisation and liberalisation – seems challenging 
since these two processes often occur together and 
simultaneously. This is particularly true for the hospital 
sector, where liberalisation occurred in a different way 
than, for example, in classical network industries such 
post and telecommunications. It did not simply mean 
the opening of markets to new competitors, but rather 
its marketisation – the introduction of market-oriented 
arrangements (Schulten and Böhlke, 2012).
‘Liberalisation’ in this instance can be described as 
abolishing public sector monopolies and creating public 
service markets with at least two providers so as to 
generate competition for customers. The introduction 
of competition, however, does not necessarily lead to 
changes in ownership (Hermann and Verhoest, 2012, p. 
7). Within the context of healthcare, including the hospital 
sector, liberalisation is most often referred to when the 
increasing need for patients’ choice is high on the agenda, 
while the objective is to achieve greater efficiency so as to 
contain costs under tight budget constraints. In this case, 
the need for more competition among service providers 
and insurance funds is advocated.
The term ‘marketisation’ means introducing market 
elements to the provision of public services (Hermann and 
Verhoest, 2012, p. 9) with the aim of market exposure. It 
is mainly used to describe the mechanism through which 
the process of liberalisation takes place. For example, 
changes in hospital financing could be regarded as an 
important element of liberalisation. One of the major 
changes was the introduction of the DRG systems, where 
instead of full coverage on a daily basis, diagnosed cases 
could be reimbursed, irrespective of the treatment applied 
and the actual costs incurred in an individual hospital. 
As a result, it became possible for hospitals to make 
financial profits or indeed deficits – a development that 
sparked the interest of investors. Subsequently, since the 
1990s, private for-profit providers have been emerging 
(Schulten and Böhlke, 2012). These developments paved 
the way for competition, which can often be associated 
with privatisation (OECD, 2012, p. 26). Marketisation took 
various forms; starting with the outsourcing of non-clinical 
activities such as laundry, catering and cleaning. However, 
this is not a subject of the current research and is only 
mentioned for reference.
The other emerging forms of privatisation with which this 
research is concerned are, according to Hermann and 
Flecker (2012):
 Outsourcing of health-related services: For example, 
diagnostic testing, laboratory services and radiology;
 PPPs: Public authorities contract private players to 
build or renovate buildings, and/or to run hospitals 
(called functional privatisation);
 Change in the legal status of hospitals: The corporate 
status of the hospital is changed so that it can operate 
under private law (called formal privatisation);
 Full privatisation: The sale of publicly owned 
hospitals to private corporations.
In principle, this last form could be deemed radical if 
privatisation is seen as a continuum (Maarse, 2006). 
Even in this case, it is important to identify what ‘private’ 
actually means; for example, how the services are funded: 
Is it fully or partially funded through public channels? Does 
the private provider operate on a non-profit or a for-profit 
basis?
Privatisation has often been the subject of fierce political 
debate. It could be slowed or revoked due to private 
failures, which could include the absence of effective cost 
control at macro level; cost shifting to the public sector, 
for example, due to cherry picking, restricted access to 
healthcare, and increasingly limited possibilities for public 
accountability (Maarse, 2006, p. 1008).
Service delivery dimensions: 
Efficiency, accessibility and quality
Describing each of the three main service delivery 
dimensions in hospital services (access, efficiency and 
quality) can be complex. However, from an analytical point 
of view, it is useful to distinguish between the different 
levels of hospital-related decision-making (Saltman et al, 
2011, pp. 4–5):
 Macro: National government decisions, determining 
the context within which hospitals operate in a given 
country (structure, organisation and financing of the 
healthcare system);
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 Meso: The overall institutional level of the hospital or 
hospitals;4
 Micro: Day-to-day operational management of staff 
and services inside the organisation.
Where most aspects of efficiency (such as cost and 
technical efficiency) are mainly linked to the micro or meso 
level of hospital governance, many of the different aspects 
of access are related to the macro level. With regards to 
quality, its first element (structure) could also be linked 
to the macro level, whereas the other two (process and 
outcome) are more related to the meso and micro levels.
Efficiency
There are various widely applied methods of quantifying 
this dimension; the most important ones are mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (literature review) with more details available in 
Hollingsworth (2008). The following forms of efficiency are 
of key importance:
Technical efficiency: The optimal use of available 
resources (Figueras and McKee, 2012, p. 24). Companies 
are technically efficient if they produce on a production 
possibility frontier (PPF) which ‘represents the maximum 
output attainable from each input level’ (Coelli et al, 2005, 
p. 3). Illustrative examples of technical inefficiencies in 
hospitals include excessive length of stay, overstaffing or 
over-prescribing (Hsu, 2010).
Allocative efficiency: This can be measured if information 
on prices is available. The other assumption is cost 
minimisation and profit maximisation behaviour. Allocative 
efficiency means that when a mix of inputs is selected, for 
example labour and capital, ‘that produces a given quantity 
of output at minimum cost’ (Coelli et al, 2005, p. 5).
Cost efficiency: The term covers the financial input only. 
Therefore, input price information is needed to measure it. 
If the total overall cost efficiency is considered, however, not 
only the input price should be taken into account, but also 
that which ‘can be expressed as a product of technical and 
allocative efficiency measures’ (Coelli et al, 2005, p. 53).
Scale efficiency: According to its definition, a unit (a 
hospital) is ‘scale efficient when its size of operations is 
optimal, so that any modifications on its size will render 
the unit less efficient. The value for scale efficiency is 
obtained by dividing the aggregate efficiency by the 
technical efficiency’ (Coelli et al, 2005).
It is assumed, with regard to cost efficiency, that hospitals 
aim to minimise their costs. This, however, is not always 
the case. For example, within the context of market failure 
in healthcare, issues such as ‘Cadillac-only medicine’ or 
‘medical arms race’ are often raised. These concepts mean 
that private provision may be less cost efficient since, 
under a competitive environment, they are incentivised 
to ‘show off’ (such as with the equipment they possess), 
although from a medical point of view that may not be 
needed (Czypionka et al, 2014).
In political debates, the size of hospitals is often raised and 
scale efficiency can be an important argument. Smaller 
hospitals are usually at higher risk of being closed down 
than larger ones – although the closure of small local 
hospitals is often opposed to by local politicians. The 
relationship between volume and quality could also be 
one of the subjects of such debates.
When measuring efficiency in healthcare (including 
hospital services), the gains in the health status of patients 
can be regarded as the final output (Hollingsworth, 
2008). However, as explained by Hollingsworth, most 
research uses some variant of intermediate outputs 
such as number of patients treated, inpatient days or 
discharges. Hollingsworth also questioned to what 
extent these variables could be regarded as ideal, even if 
adjusted with case-mix,5 since it does not capture health 
improvement. In addition, health service players could 
have other objectives, including quality of service. Even if 
in some analyses, outcome measures such as examining 
changes in health status or mortality are assessed, quality 
as an objective should also be included in measuring 
outcome. To address these shortcomings, Hollingsworth 
suggested some new measurement techniques (the use 
of multivariate models), which could take into account 
different objectives within a system of equations and, at 
the same time, allow for correlations across equations.
When measuring efficiencies, input variables often include 
the number of staff and capital invested/applied. Although 
the first aspect, technical efficiency, is clear (as is its 
definition), Palmer and Torgerson (1999) introduced the 
term ‘productive efficiency’ and with that the concept of 
the ‘relative value for money of interventions with directly 
comparable outcomes’.
To illustrate this with an example, they explain it using the 
alternative of a biochemical screening programme versus 
the maternal age programme:
If the sum of the costs of the new biochemical screening 
programme is smaller than or the same as the maternal 
age programme and outcomes are equal or better, then 
the biochemical programme is productively efficient in 
relation to the maternal age programme.
(Palmer and Torgerson, 1999)
Palmer and Torgerson use the term ‘allocative efficiency’ 
in a much broader context than Hollingsworth (2008), 
introducing a societal perspective where ‘allocative 
efficiency is achieved when resources are allocated so as 
to maximise the welfare of the community’. This aspect 
of efficiency can be directly linked to the macro-level of 
decision-making of hospital services.
Accessibility
In relation to the accessibility of public services for 
service users, Eurofound’s programme emphasised two 
terms: affordability and the availability of services to 
users’ needs. Whereas affordability refers to the patients’ 
4 Occasionally, this level may incorporate some physically separated hospitals (see the example in Saltman et al 2011, Chapter 10).
5 Case-mix is a measure that allows comparison of activity and costs in hospitals, whereby patients are classified in DRGs that have similar clinical attributes and 
resource usage.
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perspectives (co-payment, cost sharing); availability covers 
service delivery with all its complexity. This means not 
only health personnel and facilities (micro-level of hospital 
governance), but also that patients have regular access to 
all levels of healthcare (primary, secondary and tertiary).
Eurofound’s analysis of access to healthcare focused on 
five aspects: Legally covered, affordable, physical, timely 
and informed (Eurofound, 2013), which are also relevant to 
hospital services.
Legally covered access
This refers to population coverage (health insurance 
coverage), which is an integral element of a broader 
definition of access (European Commission, 2014, pp. 
8–9), and from the point of view of hospital governance, it 
appears on the macro level. Although healthcare coverage 
for hospital services is, in principle, universal in most 
EU28 Member States, eligibility depends on residency 
status or having social insurance – in most of the countries 
(Eurofound, 2013).
In principle, the extent (or depth) of coverage can also 
be related to legally covered access, since in principle, 
services that are covered by publicly financed health 
insurance should be legally regulated. The extent of 
coverage, however, varies more between Member States 
than population coverage. For example, there are certain 
services that are not included in the publicly funded 
healthcare services in all Member States; although not 
linked directly to hospital services, a typical example is 
dental care.
The problem here is that there is no exact definition of 
publicly financed treatments in several Member States. 
This causes not only uncertainty among the population, 
but also raises the importance of other aspects of access 
such as a lack of informed access, which can adversely 
affect disadvantaged groups.
Affordable access
This is linked to legally covered access, especially to the 
extent (or depth) of coverage. Affordable access can be 
problematic in countries with high private healthcare 
finance (expenditure mostly in the form of high private 
payments within cost-sharing arrangements). Affordability 
is also a relevant issue for low income patients, which 
raises the issue of equity of access. From this aspect, 
it is important to identify which are the services where 
out-of-pocket payments (co-payments for certain publicly 
financed services) are required.
Within this context, it is important to emphasise that one 
should not confuse the term ‘equity’ with ‘equality’. Equity 
refers to fairness, meaning that some individuals receive 
more care than those who have differences in their ability 
to benefit (such as financial status) or who have particular 
needs.6 This could be called ‘vertical equity’ – unequal 
treatment of unequals (Saltman et al, 2004, p. 105). 
Whereas equality (equal access) should be universal and, 
in this regard, related to legally covered access.
Private payments not only include formal arrangements, 
but can also take the form of under-the-table (secret) 
payments. The latter also affect affordable access 
(Eurofound, 2013, p. 14), even if (in most cases) such 
payments are not included in the OECD/WHO/Eurostat 
figures. Although there is considerable interest in informal 
payments, this research does not deal with it directly. 
However, a Eurofound report in 2015 (Eurofound, 2015b) 
touched on the issue, suggesting that informal payments 
have sometimes been internalised, meaning that they 
have been made formal by means of for-pay/private 
provision. The advantage of formalisation is that the 
payment becomes more transparent and doctors feel 
more comfortable about it, but the downside is that it may 
adversely affect patient access.
The Third European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) in 2012 
found that although, in general, there is a correlation 
between the share of out-of-pocket private expenditure 
of total spending on health and the proportion of people 
reporting difficulties due to costs, there are countries 
that are exceptions to this rule. The differences between 
countries may be explained by cross-country variations 
in the composition of the out-of-pocket expenditure. The 
subcategories in the System of Health Accounts (OECD, 
2011) show, for example, that out-of-pocket payments 
may consist of co-payments of necessary services not 
publicly financed, as well as voluntary health insurance or 
pharmaceuticals. It was also revealed that since 2009, the 
share of people reporting their needs had not been met 
due to financial constraints had increased. A significant 
increase was observed among unemployed people, 
migrants and urban dwellers (Eurofound, 2013, p. 17).
Access to healthcare (including preventative care) is a right 
guaranteed by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(European Parliament, 2000). Access is listed among the 
four common values of EU health systems, along with 
universality, solidarity and equity (European Commission, 
2014, p. 2).
The need to ensure access at societal level prompted 
its operationalisation for measurement for a given 
population. Access can be measured as the proportion 
of a given population in need of health services that can 
obtain them (see European Commission, 2013b, referring 
to the original definition by the WHO Regional Office for 
Europe).
Physical access
This term refers to the access and availability of amenities 
and has the following key elements:
 Certain specific services and/or treatments are 
available in the hospitals.
 The geographical distribution of hospitals at national 
level and good access to high quality and affordable 
transport. Patients must be able to get to the place 
where the hospital services are located easily. The 
distance to institutions in regions and/or smaller 
6 This is also emphasised in the Joint Assessment Framework 2015 (JAF) update. Within the context of access, it underlines the need for ensuring ‘equity in 
financing’, where payments match the ability to pay. The document also refers to ‘equity in delivery’ both in vertical terms (different treatment for different needs) 
and horizontal (equal treatment for equal needs).
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areas could determine travel time for patients, and 
a cumbersome and long journey could adversely 
affect a patient’s health condition.
 Ease of access to hospital buildings is crucial for 
certain population groups, especially within the 
context of an ageing population in the EU, where there 
is an increasing share of the population who may have 
impaired mobility.
Timely access
This term is linked primarily to availability, meaning that 
the service is available when patients need it due to their 
health conditions. Waiting lists (an important indicator 
also used in this research) pose a serious obstacle for 
patients getting the treatment they need on time. This 
aspect of access is also related to affordability.
Timely access is essential for ensuring equal access. 
Previous research has shown that people on a low income 
are at a disadvantage since they do not have the resources 
to seek alternative private care and have to wait their turn 
in the queue for public care. For example, older people 
in nine EU countries with a low income and a low level of 
educational attainment experienced long waiting times for 
non-emergency surgery (Eurofound, 2013, p. 21).
Informed access
This term refers to both service users (patients and 
providers) having sufficient knowledge to take informed 
decisions, thus facilitating adequate service provision. 
In healthcare, including hospital services, this is of high 
importance due to the complexity of health systems.
People need to be aware not only of their entitlements, but 
also be well-informed about how the healthcare system 
works in order to avail of services. This also includes users 
being aware of their legal rights. A lack of knowledge of 
one’s rights or understanding of the health system, as well 
as administrative problems, were the most frequently 
quoted barriers to access in a survey by Doctors of the 
World of over 8,000 patients (cited by Eurofound, 2013, p. 
20).
In healthcare, where information asymmetry is prevalent, 
there is a need for patients to be constantly informed of 
their illness and treatments – and of possible medical 
procedures they can choose.
Ensuring informed access is also important from an equity 
point of view. As highlighted by Eurofound research 
(Eurofound, 2013, p. 20), problems with informed access 
were found to be especially prevalent among the most 
vulnerable groups, such as the Roma.
Quality
In Eurofound’s exploratory research (Eurofound, 2015), the 
objective of achieving high quality in service delivery was 
understood as fulfilling the service users’ requirements by 
responding to their specific (individual) needs.
If quality of care is assessed, the distinction between the 
following three aspects is widely accepted and adopted by 
research communities and organisations aiming at quality 
improvement:7
 structure (input);
 process;
 outcome.
Structure describes the circumstances or settings under 
which care is provided (material and human resources as 
well as organisational characteristics).
Process refers to the content of healthcare, namely 
how resources are used (the activities of healthcare 
providers regarding diagnosis, surgery, prevention, patient 
education and so on).
Outcome means those changes that can be attributed to 
healthcare, with such diverse indicators as satisfaction and 
mortality. These indicators may be related to the findings 
of the Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) in the 
UK.8
Structural characteristics, such as ownership and its 
impact on process and outcome is a key component of this 
research. However, there are problems with assessing the 
impacts because the relationship is not straightforward 
(Romano and Mutter, 2004, pp. 133–134).
In its JAF in the area of health, the EU also adopted these 
three dimensions to measure the quality of healthcare 
(European Commission, 2015, pp. 3–13). More details can 
be found in Table 1.
Indicators of these dimensions could be as follows.
 Structure: Apart from ownership, other key 
determinants of functioning include staff 
qualifications, nurse-to-patient ratios, equipment, 
facilities and the size of healthcare institutions/
hospitals.
 Process: Examples include survey results on specific 
aspects of care or specific care, such as how patients 
are treated: the Patient Reported Experience Measures 
(PREMs) in the UK, and the waiting time for certain 
surgeries (Table 1).
 Outcome: Examples include survival, mortality, 
discharges and readmissions.
The fact that providers have to cope with high risks is 
reflected in one of the first attempts to define quality in 
healthcare: it should be managed to achieve the ‘best 
balance of health benefits and risks’ (Donabedian, 1980). 
Related, in part, to high risks, another early definition 
points to an important aspect that is also specific to 
healthcare, namely the resource need, which states that 
the primary objective should be to enable healthcare 
to improve the health status and satisfaction of a given 
population ‘within the resources which society and 
individuals have chosen to spend for that care’ (Romano 
and Mutter, 2004). The latter statement points not only to 
7 Both Romano and Mutter (2004, p. 133) and Legido-Quigley et al (2008, p. 10) refer to physician Avedis Donabedian who first described this distinction.
8 See Romano and Mutter (2004, p. 133) and Legido-Quigley et al (2008, p. 10).
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the importance of quality at societal level, but it is also 
relevant to this research since the emphasis on resources 
is a key issue and links closely to current debates on the 
extent of private sector involvement in healthcare.
The third aspect (the high relevance of professional 
knowledge) is highlighted in the following highly 
influential and widely quoted sentence9 which defines 
quality of care as:
the degree to which health services for individuals and 
populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional 
knowledge.
(Lohr, 1990)
Romano and Mutter (2004) remark that these definitions 
try to distinguish between clinical quality and other non-
clinical aspects of service delivery – the latter could be 
called ‘amenities’. Amenities include not only comfort and 
convenience, which are extremely important in hospitals, 
but also appearance as well as other patient-centred 
indicators. These include telephone inquiry reply time, 
prompt complaint resolution and the giving of adequate 
information to patients and their relatives. Although, as 
they point out, the boundaries between amenities and 
other aspects of quality could be blurred, the distinction 
is still useful as it focuses attention to ways in which 
providers allocate their resources, such as how likely they 
are to invest in improving patients’ outcomes, or if they 
prefer to invest more in comfort.
The fact that the boundaries of these two aspects of 
quality can be blurred not only points to the difficulties in 
measuring quality, but indicates that there is also a close 
link to access10; the examples of patient-centred measures 
could belong, for instance, to the categories of timely, 
informed access or availability.
This distinction between these two aspects of quality 
is also relevant to this research. In a competitive 
environment, some private providers (in principle) may 
want to attract patients by prioritising comfort over 
improving the outcome of the patient’s health. There 
is, however, no doubt that the two are closely linked. 
Quality of amenities is of great importance, especially for 
patients who have to stay in hospital for a long time due to 
chronic illness, or when contact between patients/people 
(relatives) and service providers is frequent. This could be 
an aspect to consider when assessing the impact of private 
sector involvement on quality.
In order to operationalise the definition of quality, 
besides underlining current professional knowledge (the 
importance of standards), it is worth emphasising two 
other points from the above definition:
 It identifies two groups as targets for quality assurance 
purposes: individuals and populations.
 Compared with earlier definitions, it covers broader 
target groups than just patients, meaning a broad 
definition, which includes health promotion and 
prevention.11
For an elaboration of quality indicators, an emphasis on 
the types of quality problems may also be useful. Such 
problems could include:
 inappropriate use of care, such as overuse – providing 
too much/unnecessary care (closely related to the 
dimension of efficiency);
 inappropriate underuse, or misuse of care – 
‘assessments of the quantity and of the quality of care 
are thus inextricably intertwined’ (Donabedian, 1980).
Due to its close connection to efficiency, it is 
understandable that when dimensions of quality are 
identified by authors and organisations defining quality, 
efficiency is always listed among them. Even if access is 
mentioned less frequently among quality dimensions, 
it is still important. It is worth noting that equity is also 
included in some classifications12. Safety, appropriateness, 
responsiveness, satisfaction, health improvement, 
continuity and prevention/early detection are also 
mentioned among the dimensions (Legido-Quigley et al, 
2008, pp. 5–6).
The European Commission’s JAF has over 40 indicators in 
the area of health. In its summary overview, it was unable 
to deal with such a wide range of indicators and so the 
aim was ‘to identify some indicators that, together, could 
be representative of the overall quality of the health care 
system’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 28).
The JAF includes process and outcome measures, 
based partly on the OECD Quality of Care Indicators13 
(European Commission, 2015, pp. 25, 27–30). Table 1 lists 
the indicators that are specifically relevant to hospital 
services.
Table 2 lists the key elements of the definitions of the three 
dimensions.
9 This definition was first published in 1990 by the Institute of Medicine (Lohr, 1990) and quoted, for example, by Romano and Mutter, (2004, p. 132) and Legido-
Quigley et al, (2008, p.4). 
10 This is confirmed by the fact that Andersen et al (1983, p. 49) listed ‘convenience of services’ or consumer satisfaction with services among operational measures 
for access whereas, as can be seen here, these could also be regarded as indicators for quality.
11 Legido-Quigley et al (2008, pp. 3–4) also list other elements such as measurement (scale), importance of individual patients’ needs, lifestyle preferences and values. 
This implies that patients’ views are taken into account during decision-making.
12 See Table 1.2 on dimensions of quality of care in Legido-Quigley et al (2008, p. 5).
13 For more information about these indicators, see http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-care-quality-indicators.htm
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Table 1: Indicators relevant to hospital services among Joint Assessment Framework (Health) and OECD Health 
Care Quality Indicators
Joint Assessment Framework (Health) OECD Health Care Quality Indicators
Cancer care Avoidable hospital admissions
Care for acute exacerbation of chronic conditions (AMI) Waiting times for hip fracture surgery
Care for chronic conditions Surgical complications
Care for mental disorder
Patient safety
Note: The focus here is on process rather than clinical outcome indicators.
Source: European Commission (2015); OECD (2015, Chapter 8).
Table 2: Key elements of the definitions of efficiency, accessibility and quality
Efficiency Accessibility Quality
Cost efficiency Physical accessibility Structure (input)
Technical efficiency
Overall efficiency (technical and allocative 
price efficiency)
Timely accessibility
Process
Outcome
Informed accessibility
Legally covered accessibility
Affordable accessibility
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
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2 Overview of the methodology
This report is based on several types of evidence. Firstly, 
private provision in 14 Member States was mapped 
using a questionnaire completed by the Eurofound 
research team and Eurofound’s Network of European 
correspondents.
Secondly, a literature review and six case studies were 
conducted to understand the effect of hospital ownership 
on service delivery. Given the need for robust evidence 
that controls factors that may have an impact on service 
delivery other than hospital ownership, the project 
gathered evidence that had been searched, appraised and 
synthesised in a systematic way in the form of a literature 
review using the rapid evidence assessment (REA) method. 
The findings from this review informed the selection and 
design of the six country case studies carried out to gain 
more in-depth understanding of the differences between 
public and private hospital services and the reasons 
behind them. This was achieved by including – in the semi-
structured interviews – questions about the dimensions of 
service delivery identified in the REA as being affected by 
hospital ownership such as length of stay, upcoding and 
mortality rates.
Finally, the report also benefited from the input of 
stakeholders such as trade unions, employer associations, 
academia, and hospital associations. Given the sensitivity 
and complexity of the topic, input from different 
perspectives has been employed to secure an accurate and 
balanced interpretation and presentation of the evidence 
available – and the policy pointers derived from them. The 
different methods and their objectives are summarised in 
Table 3.
National overview of private 
provision
This report brings together the findings obtained from 
desk research carried out by Eurofound’s Network of 
European correspondents in Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain 
and the UK. A questionnaire was distributed in April 2015 
among the correspondents that carried out the desk 
research and consultation with relevant stakeholders from 
May to September that year. Eurofound’s research team 
also provided information obtained between January and 
April 2016 from Germany, Hungary and Ireland.
In order to focus on countries where the private sector 
plays a substantial role in service provision, it was decided 
to choose countries where the number of beds in private 
for-profit14 hospitals constituted at least 5% of the total 
number of hospital beds in 2011.15 This led to the inclusion 
of Cyprus (49%), Greece (30%), Germany (30%), Italy (28%), 
Poland (27%), France (24%), Spain (18%), Bulgaria (13%), 
Austria (12%), Latvia (9%), Portugal (8%) and Estonia (5%). 
Romania was also added to the list of countries given that 
it is – by far – the country in Europe where the number 
of beds in for-profit hospitals has increased the most in 
recent years.16
The number of hospital beds does not completely capture 
the extent of public and private provision. In addition, 
comparable data were not available in several Member 
States. Countries were therefore selected for review taking 
into account whether there had been relevant policy 
developments and whether the research team could 
gather information easily. This led to the inclusion of 
Hungary, Ireland and the UK, and the exclusion of Cyprus 
and Greece.
The description of for-profit and non-profit private 
provision in these countries includes:
 the main drivers for increased private provision;
 the process and form by which the private sector 
provides hospital services;
 the impact of the economic crisis and austerity 
measures on hospital services;
Table 3: Objectives of different methods used to obtain evidence for this report
Method Objective
Questionnaire completed by Eurofound’s research team and 
the Network of European correspondents
Overview of private provision in 14 Member States
Literature review and case studies Gathering evidence about aspects of service delivery 
influenced by hospital ownership, with particular emphasis on 
those aspects identified in the literature review
Expert meetings Review of the report and discussion of the policy pointers
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
14 The number of beds in non-profit hospitals was not used as a criterion given the gaps in the data available from Eurostat.
15 2011 was the latest year for which data were available at the time the countries were chosen.
16 According to Eurostat data, there were 3,627 beds in for-profit hospitals in 2011 compared with 960 in 2007, an increase of 278%. The reason behind this is the 
increase in the number of for-profit hospitals in Romania from 23 in 2007 to 98 in 2011.
Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the private sector?
14
 whether private provision has contributed to tackling 
some of the challenges faced by Member States as 
a consequence of the crisis (for example, whether it 
has contributed to achieving savings, reducing deficits 
or containing costs).
The analysis also presents information about the impact of 
private provision on service delivery (for example, changes 
in staff, number of beds, types of services offered and their 
accessibility).
Finally, the national overview includes the views of service 
users, the public, social partners and other organisations 
(such as political parties and think tanks) about the role of 
private providers in the hospital sector.
Literature review
The role of for-profit private providers in healthcare and 
their impact on service delivery elicits polarised views 
(particularly in the privatisation of hospitals), often being 
a central issue in the political debate. In addition, studies 
analysing the impact of hospital ownership on the quality, 
accessibility and efficiency of services give mixed results 
and tend not to focus on the situation of hospitals in 
Europe. This report includes the results of a literature 
review that identified, appraised and synthesised the 
findings of European research studies. This research 
provides further insight into how private provision 
influences the efficiency, quality and accessibility of 
services through case studies carried out in six Member 
States.
As stated above, the methodology used for the literature 
review of studies looking at the private provision of 
hospital services was an REA. This type of literature review 
can be described as an assessment of what is known about 
an issue by using systematic review methods regarding the 
search strategy and critical appraisal. However, it makes 
concessions on the breadth and/or depth of the process 
(Grant and Booth, 2009). Studies are only included if they 
satisfy certain quality criteria.
The REA was primarily conducted in the period between 
mid-August and the beginning of October 2015. All the 
articles were made accessible in case the full text was 
required. To safeguard the quality and limit selection 
bias, a second opinion was given by a second researcher 
about the articles that were identified as disputable at 
the full text stage. The search and appraisal processes are 
explained in more detail in the Annex.
Country case studies
Objectives
The six country case studies synthesised in this report 
aim to provide further insight on the influence of private 
provision on the efficiency, quality and accessibility of 
the medical services delivered in hospitals. As efficiency, 
quality and accessibility cover a wide range of indicators, 
particular attention was given to the outcomes identified 
in the literature review as being influenced by private 
provision. The case studies are therefore intended to 
complement the literature review by providing a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the differences in 
public and private service provision.
As many studies identified in the review had findings 
that are mixed or context specific, the case studies also 
provide an illustration how private provision takes place in 
different countries. Furthermore, the case studies explore 
the relations between the three dimensions of service 
delivery, which seem to have been rarely addressed by 
previous research which appears to be mostly focused on 
one dimension of service delivery (Hsu, 2010; Tiemann et 
al, 2012). However, the information provided by the case 
studies is context specific and is constrained by the limited 
access to thorough studies.
The case studies also show how the quality of medical 
services is monitored (and improved) in private hospitals, 
either by the hospitals themselves with internal quality 
management mechanisms or by third parties (for 
example, inspections, accreditation). These quality 
monitoring and improvement procedures are compared 
with those in public hospitals. The interviews carried 
out as part of the case studies also provided input for 
policy recommendations about how to improve service 
provision in private hospitals and how the public sector 
can contribute to this.
Design and selection
The design of the case studies followed the embedded 
multiple case study approach described by Yin (2003), 
with private hospitals (in general) in each country 
being the unit of study and the clinical services in two 
individual hospitals per country as embedded subunits. 
The information in the country case studies was gathered 
through interviews and analysis of the documentation and 
archival records available. Having access to interviewees 
and documentation was therefore the main criterion for 
selecting the countries and the hospitals. The case studies 
carried out in Germany and Ireland by the Eurofound 
research team during January to March 2016 were used as 
pilot case studies.
The initial approach was to choose countries where it 
was possible to access evaluations of service delivery 
in individual hospitals. However, the pilot case studies 
and the initial contacts and desk research showed that 
this information was generally not available. In many 
cases, interviewees were not able or willing to provide 
information about service delivery in specific hospitals, 
preferring to discuss private hospitals in the country in 
general. Therefore, selection depended on other sources 
of documentation and archival records such as inspection 
reports, data provided by hospitals or other organisations, 
and studies focusing on several hospitals. These 
documents and archival records were used to design the 
semi-structured interviews as well as to contextualise the 
information provided by the interviewees.
The results from the questionnaire filled in by Eurofound’s 
Network of European correspondents and the 
studies identified in the literature review indicate 
that service delivery is greatly influenced by factors 
outside of hospitals. So while the unit of study is 
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private hospitals and their medical services, the unit of 
data collection includes information and interviewees 
from outside hospital settings in order to gather more 
information about how external factors influence service 
delivery. To obtain information about the context in 
which hospitals operate, the country case studies were 
chosen from the 11 Member States for which the national 
correspondents provided information.
Since the study focuses on private provision during the 
past ten years, whenever possible the preference was to 
use newly built private hospitals (for-profit and non-profit) 
since 2004, or hospitals sold to the private sector after that 
date. Given the need to finalise the pilot case studies in 
Germany and Ireland by March 2016, and because there 
was no background information on these two countries 
from the Network of European correspondents, their 
focus was more on the national setting than on individual 
hospitals and the cut-off point of 2004 for the building 
and privatisation of hospitals. The rest of the case studies 
were carried out between February and June 2016 by 
a consortium of contractors.
Box 2 lists the countries selected and the hospitals 
included in each case study. A further aim was to include 
countries representing different types of healthcare 
systems. Furthermore, it was hoped to include both for-
profit and non-profit hospitals, as well as different types of 
privatisation. However, given the need to prioritise those 
countries where information was available and where 
it was possible to do interviews, most of the hospitals 
included in the case studies are for-profit.
Box 2: Summary of the country case studies and hospitals
Austria: Social health insurance system
Citizens are insured in a fund based on the location of their employment, with no free choice of funds. Patients receive 
free treatments at all hospitals financed by health funds, so-called ‘fund hospitals’. The health funds themselves receive 
funding from health insurance funds as well as the regional and national government. In 2014, Austria had 154 public 
hospitals and 125 privately owned hospitals. Of the private hospitals, 82 belong to private companies, 37 to religious 
orders and 6 to foundations (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2015). Private not-for-profit hospitals are often those 
run by religious orders which get reimbursed for their services by regional health funds – like public hospitals, and 
receive the same amount of funding per treatment. Private not-for-profit hospitals, therefore, have a public mandate for 
the provision of health services and thus treat all patients with statutory health insurance for free.
 Krankenhaus Oberndorf (PPP) is a former public hospital where private providers are in charge of human resources 
management, with staff having contracts either with the public sector or the private company. Patients with 
statutory health insurance can get free treatment at this hospital. The hospital covers a variety of specialities 
including internal medicine, general and trauma surgery, orthopaedics and intensive care, and has just over 100 
beds.
 Privatklinik Graz Ragnitz (private for-profit) provides infrastructure for independent physicians to treat patients, 
including inpatients services. It has just less than 150 beds and is the only private for-profit hospital in Austria with 
an intensive care unit.
Germany: Social health insurance system
In 2012 there were 2017 hospitals with a total of 501,475 beds (6.2 beds per 1,000 people; higher than any other EU 
country). Of these, 48% of beds were in publicly owned hospitals, 34% in private non-profit and 18% in private for-profit 
hospitals (Busse and Blümel, 2014).
Of the 2017 hospitals, nearly 30% of them were public, 36% private not-for-profit and 35% private for-profit (Nolte et al, 
2014).
 Non-profit hospital group: Group of 10 hospitals including 2 privatised hospitals.
 Non-profit hospital: Hospital with approximately 600 beds.
Ireland: National health insurance system 
The vast majority of the revenue of private hospitals (approximately 45%) comes from voluntary health insurance, with 
individual hospitals contracting with health insurance providers. In 2016 there were 50 public hospitals and about 20 
private hospitals.
 For-profit hospital: Private hospital with an emergency department.
 Non-profit mental health hospital.
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Italy: National health insurance system
Since 2001, after a Constitutional reform, the National Health System has become regionally based. The 19 regions and 2 
autonomous provinces are responsible for the organisation and delivery of health services through local health units. The 
private hospital sector can be divided into two categories:
 Private hospitals that can provide performance equivalent to public hospitals recognised as ‘accredited hospitals’ that 
receive a fee for their services directly from the regions or the National Health System.
 Non-accredited private hospitals that are only authorised to perform certain healthcare activities and are paid for 
directly by citizens. These hospitals either do not have suitable performance levels, are not needed for the general 
public strategy of the region, or may choose not to be accredited.
In 2014, there were 1,435 hospital facilities in Italy, of which 760 were public hospitals, 608 private accredited and 64 private 
not-accredited hospitals. In the private sector, 28 hospitals are religious or belong to a religious order (classificato), 50 are 
National Institutes for Scientific Research (IRCCS) and 3 are private university hospitals.
 For-profit hospital, previously non-profit: Large hospital that includes a research institute.
 Centro Ortopedico di Quadrante (PPP): Previously public, now managed by the private sector, focusing on 
orthopaedics, rehabilitation and ophthalmology. It has around 93 beds and approximately 190 employees, 60 of which 
have a contract with the public sector, while the rest are private.
Romania: Healthcare in transition
The Romanian healthcare system is dominated by public funding, generated through a combination of mandatory health 
insurance, with contributions from both employer and employees as a percentage of gross salary, and direct contributions 
from the state budget via the Ministry of Health. In 2014, there were 527 hospitals in Romania, 161 of which were private. 
Private hospitals tend to be small, with only 58 providing more than 20 beds and only 16 hospitals with more than 100 beds.
 For-profit hospital: Consists of two private facilities, one multidisciplinary hospital (approximately 75 beds) and an 
obstetrics/gynaecology facility (approximately 140 beds).
 For-profit hospital: Multidisciplinary inpatient facility specialising in cardiovascular diseases with approximately 140 
beds.
UK: National Health Service (NHS) system
In 2013, 465 hospitals in the UK were owned and managed by private companies. Their largest source of revenue in 2012 
came from patients with private medical insurance (55%), followed by patients funded through the NHS (27.5%) (CMA, 
2014). Only a small number of private hospital services operate completely independently of the NHS, accepting only 
private patients.
 Nottingham NHS Treatment Centre (newly built for-profit clinic): Opened in 2008, located next to an NHS Trust 
hospital from which more than 90% of its staff were seconded under protected terms and conditions (for example, 
remuneration and pension entitlement)
 Circle Bath (newly built for-profit hospital): Opened in 2010 and offers 30 overnight beds and 22 day surgery beds to 
private and NHS patients. It runs four operating theatres and an endoscopy suite, as well as a full diagnostic service.
Note: The healthcare system typology used was developed by Böhm et al (2012).
Source: Case studies.
Methodology and synthesis
The case studies follow the quality standards set out 
by Eurofound (2007), including the recommendation 
that case studies should include the views of different 
stakeholders. Interviewees were therefore selected on the 
basis of the extent they could provide information specific 
to the two hospitals selected in each country, the situation 
in similar public hospitals and/or the influence of factors 
external to the hospital's settings.
A total of 40 interviews were carried out, including 
representatives from the following organisations:
 governments;
 regulatory/monitoring bodies such as inspectorates 
and quality assurance agencies;
 private medical service providers;
 hospital managers;
 professional associations (for example, doctors, 
nurses and medical technicians);
 patients’ associations;
 trade unions;
 other (evaluators, academic experts, insurance 
companies, carers and patient family associations).
As some interviewees and hospitals preferred to be 
anonymous, in some cases only the occupation, type of 
organisation and country are included in the research 
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report (for example, an interview with a member of staff in 
a for-profit hospital in Ireland).
The interviews were semi-structured to ensure that service 
delivery domains and policy recommendations were 
covered, while at the same time, allowing interviewees 
to refer to those issues more relevant for them in each 
domain.
The questionnaire was adapted according to the type of 
informant. The information provided by the literature 
review, the questionnaire completed by national 
correspondents and other sources of information were 
used to pose additional questions relevant for hospitals 
(in some countries) for specific forms or private provision 
such as PPPs.
The ‘cross-cutting’ case synthesis focused on themes that 
cut across the interviews and documents, presenting the 
different views and evidence available about a specific 
topic. The analysis was guided by the links between 
private provision and services delivery described in the 
literature review.
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3 Private provision of hospital 
services
This chapter describes the form in which private provision 
(for-profit and non-profit) occurs. It is based mainly on 
the information provided by the Network of European 
correspondents and the Eurofound research team from 
14 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain and the UK). The chapter examines the 
privatisation of hospital services and describes the context 
in which private provision takes place, with a particular 
emphasis on the market-based mechanisms introduced to 
make hospitals more competitive.
Drivers of private provision
Policy driven private provision
Changes in policy that favour the role of the private sector 
as the service provider and diminish the role of the State 
have been one of the drivers for increased private provision 
in Austria, Estonia, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK. Policies that proactively increase the role of the private 
sector are linked to wider policy and ideological changes in 
other areas (Maarse, 2006). Furthermore, the role of the EU 
in liberalising other sectors has been identified as a driving 
force promoting the idea of privatisation as an efficient 
policy strategy (Schulten, 2006).
The rationale in many cases is that a bigger role for the 
private sector leads to gains in efficiency. In Estonia, for 
example, liberalisation began in the early 2000s and was 
seen as a tool to achieve a more efficient use of resources, 
making it easier to downsize the provider network and 
obtain transparent contractual arrangements. Gains in 
efficiency were also one of the stated reasons for the 
introduction in 2011 in Poland of an act on medical 
activity, which included provisions concerning the 
transformation of public hospitals into commercial 
companies providing medical services. Similarly, achieving 
higher quality of services by taking power away from 
health authorities and placing it with managers and 
medical staff was the main rationale for the purchaser/
provider split established in the NHS in the UK in 1990.
Containing costs and reducing government 
expenditure
Supply factors (for example, technological changes and the 
need for new skills), the rise in prices of pharmaceutics and 
equipment, and an increase in the demand for services, have 
all contributed to rising costs (André and Hermann, 2009).
Cost containment was one of the main concerns in Portugal 
in 2002 when a newly elected government introduced 
a legal framework for the management of hospitals. The 
reduction of the operational costs of hospitals was also part 
of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2011 by 
the Portuguese government, the European Commission, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Central Bank. In the UK, the introduction in 2012 of a new 
Health and Social Care Act was justified by citing rising 
demand and cost of treatments, the need for improvement 
and the state of the public finances (Department of Health, 
2012). In France, the costs of public and private hospitals are 
compared in the National Cost Study. The aim of this study 
is to establish ‘yardstick competition’ and to put pressure 
on hospitals to reduce their cost.
Reducing debt in public hospitals has also led to 
privatisation. In Poland, the government’s B Plan sought 
to address hospital debts. Since 2011, local governments 
(which own public hospitals) have been able to convert 
indebted entities into companies and obtain partial debt 
relief, or take over the debt. In Germany, regional public 
hospitals ran up deficits due to the financial crisis and the 
shift to the DRG system (Klenk and Pieper, 2012). According 
to Klenk ‘Public authorities in turn have welcomed the new 
actors as they have promised smart solutions for indebted 
communities withdrawing from funding responsibilities’ 
(Klenk 2011, p. 263). The EU Stability and Growth Pact put 
further pressure on the German government to comply 
with the public deficit limits (Schulten, 2006). Regions, 
districts and cities are selling their hospitals to the private 
sector because they can access financial capital more 
easily and the ageing population makes it an attractive 
sector for private providers. One of the hospitals included 
in the Austrian case study belonged previously to the local 
authority. Given that it was increasingly difficult to sustain 
the hospital financially, the municipality looked for a private 
partner to establish a PPP (Municipality of Oberndorf, 2007).
The introduction of co-payments in public services has also 
led to increased use of private hospital services. In Italy, the 
increase in co-payments for blood and laboratory tests has 
led to an increase in the use of privately provided services 
as their waiting times are shorter and the costs are similar.
Tackling waiting lists and meeting the demand 
for specific services
Services for which there are long waiting lists in public 
hospitals constitute a market niche for private providers 
in Estonia, Italy and Latvia. In Estonia, for example, 
gynaecology, ophthalmology, urology, surgery involving 
the head and neck, psychiatry and orthopaedics are 
provided by the private sector due to the long waiting 
lists in public hospitals. The two hospitals included in the 
Romanian case study were established to meet demands 
that were either not met or were underfunded by the 
public health system.
Contracting out care to private hospitals is one of the 
options followed by the public sector to reduce waiting lists 
in public hospitals. The initial objective of the establishment 
in the UK of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs – 
private specialist hospitals contracted to provide treatment 
for free to NHS patients) was to reduce waiting times in the 
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NHS by separating planned procedures from emergency 
care and thus increase the surgical capacity available to the 
NHS (Department of Health, 2006). In Ireland, the private 
sector has been frequently contracted out to provide 
diagnostics for patients in public hospitals.
Private provision in the past decade
Available data about the number of public and private 
hospitals and their beds show a decrease in the number 
and capacity of public hospitals between 2006 and 2014. 
During this period, the number of beds in for-profit 
hospitals increased in 9 out of the 15 Member States for 
which data are available, with particularly sharp increases 
in Bulgaria and Romania.
Increases in the number of hospital beds in private 
hospitals in France, and to a lesser extent in Greece, are 
coupled with decreases in the number of private hospitals. 
This indicates that the increased role of the private sector 
has occurred as a result of mergers and the expansion of 
the capacity of already existing hospitals.
By way of contrast, in Bulgaria, where the large number 
of hospitals is highlighted as one of the main challenges 
for the health system, only one private hospital has closed 
up to 2015. Mergers between hospitals are planned by the 
Ministry of Health in order to achieve savings. Some of the 
hospitals with large debts have closed, while others have 
been transformed into smaller medical institutions for 
outpatient care.
Similarly, some of the hospitals closed in Romania as part 
of the National Plan of Rationalising Hospital Capacity 
reopened during the past two years under various systems 
of specialisation, either for ambulatory services (12 
general medical centres) or other medical services (for 
example, 21 elderly care centres).
In Portugal, mergers have taken place as part of the 
austerity measures. After the signing of the Memorandum 
of Understanding in 2011, the Portuguese government 
set a target to reduce the operational costs of hospitals 
by €200 million, including a reduction in the number of 
management staff (from eight to five members of hospital 
boards). This led to a reorganisation and rationalisation 
of the hospital network through the specialisation and 
concentration of hospital and emergency services, and the 
joint management and operation of hospitals. The closure 
of public hospitals was offset, in some cases, by the 
absorption of their services by other public hospitals.
Non-profit provision decreased during the 2006–2014 
period in all the countries for which data are available, 
with the exception of Italy and Portugal. In France, the 
fixing of reimbursement rates since 2010 has meant that 
some private non-profit hospitals have faced closure 
(HOPE, 2011).
Table 4 shows the percentage change by ownership type in 
the number of hospitals and hospital beds between 2006 
and 2014 in those countries for which data are available.
Table 4: Percentage change in the number of hospitals and hospital beds by ownership type, 2006–2014
Public 
hospitals (%)
For-profit 
hospitals (%)
Non-profit 
hospitals (%)
Countries Beds Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds Hospitals
Austria -2.4 -1.9 41.0 27.7 0.4
Bulgaria -8.6 291.5
Cyprus 7.4 -3.4
Denmark -27.5 -5.7 -2.4
Estonia -9.2 -42.9 -31.1 -36.4 -44.2 -62.5
Finland -32.6 -34.5 -37.1 13.3 -15.1
France -12.9 39.9 3.6 -5.2 -9.1 -11.1
Germany -6.7 -13.5 8.2 2.4 -6.1 -33.3
Greece -18.6 -12.1 0.3 -8.8 -43.6
Hungary -10.9 -4.4 -0.2 0 -6.8 0
Italy -14.5 -16.4 -0.2 -6.7 8.1 6.1
Latvia -38.3 20.2
Lithuania -9.6 29.7
Luxembourg -64.3
Poland -7.9 -12.2 0.5 57.5 0 0
Portugal -12.1 -7.1 45.4 11.1 2.2 16.3
Romania -12.1 633.4
Spain -1.5 -9.8 -5.7 -19.1 -15
UK -18.2
Notes: Data for Hungary correspond to 2006–2011 (number of beds) and 2007–2011 (number of hospitals).
Data for Italy correspond to 2006–2013 (number of beds) and 2007–2014 (number of hospitals).
Data for Poland correspond to 2007–2011.
Source: Eurostat and OECD.
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The closure of public hospitals creates a gap in provision, 
providing new opportunities for the private sector with 
the possibility of reusing the existing infrastructure. As 
a consequence of the restructuring of public hospitals 
in Latvia, for example, equipment that in many cases 
had been recently obtained from State-funded or EU-
supported healthcare development programmes could be 
bought by doctors and owners of private companies.
However, a decrease in public and non-profit provision 
does not necessarily mean its replacement by for-profit 
providers. Closures in many countries have been offset 
by the creation of alternative structures. This shift in the 
type of care is linked to a longstanding trend that aims 
to reduce expenditure by closing hospitals or reducing 
their capacity (Schulten and Böhlke, 2012). It is also linked 
to reforms accelerated by the crisis that aim to reduce 
hospital stays and (in some countries) promote community 
care (Eurofound, 2014).
In France, the longstanding reduction in the number 
of acute care hospital beds has run parallel to the 
development of ambulatory care. According to a study by 
DREES (2014), the number of acute care hospital beds fell 
from 468,000 in 2003 to 415,000 in 2012, mainly in long-
stay services (from 80,000 to 32,000).
In Italy, the main measure adopted to curtail health 
costs was the generalised reduction in centres with 
a small number of beds or with departments performing 
a small number of services. This reduction was meant 
to be compensated for by an increase in domiciliary and 
residential healthcare services and early screenings of 
pathologies, but this did not take place in those regions 
whose health budgets had been reduced.
Figure 1 shows the current share of beds in hospitals 
by ownership type in 2014. Private for-profit provision 
ranged from a fifth of the total number of hospital beds 
or more in Bulgaria (20%) to almost half in Cyprus (48%), 
with the position in France (24%), Poland (27%), Italy 
(28%), Germany (30%) and Greece (33%) in between. 
Non-profit hospitals constituted more than a tenth of 
the total number of beds in Spain (12%), France (14%), 
Austria (17%), Portugal (20%) and Germany (29%); in the 
Netherlands all hospitals fall into the non-profit category.
There are wide variations in the degree of private provision 
within countries. In Spain, for example, the devolution 
of healthcare to the regions in 1997 led to different levels 
of private provision, depending on the political party in 
power in the regional government and the interest groups 
present in each region. This resulted in wide differences 
in terms of the health expenditure allocated to private 
contracting, ranging from Catalonia allocating 24% of 
its health budget, to the neighbouring region of Aragon 
allocating just 4%. This disparity also affects the types 
of private provision arrangements. For instance, health 
consortia have been relatively frequent in Catalonia, 
whereas several privatisation processes have been 
adopted in Madrid and Valencia.
Figure 1: Share of hospital beds by ownership type, 2014 (%)
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Notes: Data for public hospitals in Denmark correspond to 2015, Hungary to 2011 and Italy to 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
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Liberalisation, marketisation and 
privatisation
Liberalisation and marketisation of the 
hospital sector
Unlike other sectors, the liberalisation of hospital 
services does not just entail opening up the market to 
new competitors, but also promoting competition and 
introducing market-oriented mechanisms, mainly in the 
hospital financing system (Schulten and Böhlke, 2012). 
This includes the introduction of a split of the funding 
and delivery of services. It also includes reforms that 
replace the full cost coverage with performance-based 
reimbursement (Herman and Verhoest, 2012). This has led, 
in several countries, to the introduction of DRGs – patient 
classification systems that collect patient discharge data 
(Quentin et al, 2011). DRGs were introduced primarily to 
improve the efficiency of hospitals through incentives, 
giving the possibility of making a profit or having a deficit 
depending on the competitiveness of the hospital. DRGs 
have gradually been implemented in European countries 
since the 1980s in order to classify patients and, later on, 
for payment purposes (Geissler et al, 2011).
The increase in price-based competition can lead to 
privatisation and an increased role for private providers 
if it creates an opportunity for making profits (Krachler 
and Greer, 2015). Otherwise, liberalisation can lead to the 
public sector continuing as a private monopoly with no 
market competition, which can itself be a precursor to 
market competition (Maarse, 2006).
In Spain, the General Health Law in 1986 approved the 
so-called agreements or ‘accords’ with the private sector 
by which private hospitals can offer some kind of health 
service to national health service patients depending 
on the coverage level of each agreement; the amount of 
private resources aimed at patients in the public health 
system varies. This law establishes that non-profit entities 
should be prioritised when it comes to establishing 
these agreements. Nowadays, around 49% of the private 
hospitals in Spain have some type of agreement by which 
they offer health services to patients of the National Health 
System. Further legislative changes in 1997 gave other 
entities (not just public administrations) the possibility of 
managing public hospitals via agreements with private 
centres, indirect management forms, private foundations, 
and so on.
In Italy, Legislative Decree No. 502 (30 December 1992), 
which governs the institutional accreditation system, 
provides the possibility for private healthcare facilities to 
operate within the National Health Service. A decree from 
1993 sets out that local health authorities are supposed to 
agree on predicted fees to fund the supply of healthcare 
services by public and private providers.
In Poland, the 1999 General Health Insurance Act 
introduced a social insurance system and 16 regional 
sickness funds to finance the direct costs of health services 
to patients through contracts between service providers 
and buyers. The high level of administrative work and the 
lack of funding for certain functions led in 2003 to these 
sickness funds being replaced with a National Health Fund. 
A system mostly based on UK Healthcare Resource Groups 
(a variant of DRGs adapted to the healthcare system in the 
UK) was introduced in 2008.
In Hungary, purchaser and provider functions were split in 
1993 with the establishment of a new purchasing body, the 
National Health Insurance Fund Administration. A DRG-
type output-based payment method, called Homogeneous 
Disease Groups, was also established in 1993 (Gaál et al, 
2011).
In Romania, the 2006 National Health Reform Law made 
numerous provisions for the accreditation and certification 
of private health service providers. These accreditation 
and certification standards favoured the liberalisation of 
health services, as such providers could now ‘officially’ 
take over certain publicly funded activities, especially 
laboratory testing and ambulatory services. The DRG 
system was first introduced in 2005 and was subsequently 
the subject of reform, with the current version last 
regulated in 2012.
In Austria, there is no special national legislation on 
liberalisation issues affecting the hospital sector, since 
the maintenance and management of public hospitals 
generally falls within the responsibility of the federal 
states. DRGs have been in place since 1997.
Rather than a liberalisation of the hospital sector, what 
has taken place in other countries is a change in the 
legal framework (Estonia) or the possibility of privatising 
hospitals (Bulgaria, albeit for a limited period). In Bulgaria, 
DRGs have not been introduced and payments to hospitals 
are based on clinical pathways that set fixed prices for 
categories made up of similar diagnoses. This system has 
been criticised because prices have no direct connection 
to the actual costs incurred by hospitals (for example, it is 
not connected to the degree of severity within a diagnosis) 
(Konstantinov, 2011).
Corporatisation of public hospitals
The change of legal status of public hospitals to become 
companies under private law has taken place in several 
countries with the objective of reducing public debt, 
introducing new management strategies, increasing the 
independence of hospitals and giving better access to 
finance.
Since the 1980s, virtually all Austrian provinces have 
established hospital holding companies fully owned by the 
federal states. Public hospitals are managed by private law 
corporations, but are fully owned by the province. In most 
federal states, the holdings that manage public hospitals 
are organised according to private law. Nevertheless, 
the provincial authority – as the owner of these holding 
companies – has full liability.
In Estonia, the change in the legal framework applied to 
existing hospitals. The liberalisation of hospitals took place 
in 2001 and 2002 when a new Health Services Organisation 
Act and a new Health Insurance Act were adopted. As 
a consequence of the new legislation, all public hospitals 
began to act under private law, having full managerial 
rights over assets and access to financial markets. Most 
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hospitals are either limited liability companies owned 
by local governments or foundations established by 
municipalities or other public agencies. Therefore, most 
hospitals are public but they are run as businesses, with 
management incentives aiming at efficient financial 
performance (Kahur et al, 2011).
In the UK, the National Health Service and Community 
Care Act 1990 introduced the possibility of hospitals 
and other healthcare providers to be independent from 
health authority control by having trust status, with health 
authorities becoming the purchaser of care from these 
trusts. These NHS foundation trusts have better access 
to capital funding and can accumulate surpluses or run 
temporary deficits (Harrison, 2013). Between 2004 and 
2013, a total of 147 foundation trusts were licensed.
In Poland, the conversion from public to private hospitals 
included some degree of debt relief, which was used to 
prevent possible mergers or closures. The 2011 Act on 
Medical Activity allowed the transformation of public 
hospitals into commercial companies providing medical 
services. In the period between 2002 and 2014, a total 
of 170 public hospitals were transformed into limited 
companies; the number of public hospitals transformed 
into limited companies doubled during the financial crisis.
Corporatisation has been the main form of privatisation 
in Portugal. Up to 2002, all public hospitals belonging to 
the administrative public sector were subject to public/
administrative law. The reform introduced that year 
established a new legal regime whereby hospitals would 
have one of the following legal statuses:
 public establishment;
 public establishment managed by a private company;
 public limited company with exclusively public capital;
 private establishment (for-profit or non-profit).
A further reform took place in 2005 by which all public 
limited companies of exclusively public capital changed 
their status to a public establishment managed by 
a private company.
In 2008, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law allowing 
for the corporatisation of hospitals. As a consequence, 
36 of the 126 state and local hospitals were transformed. 
However, the law was overturned by the government that 
came into power in 2010.
Full or partial privatisation of hospitals
The sale of public hospitals – partially or in their entirety to 
private providers – is still an uncommon process in most of 
the countries analysed.
Although partial privatisation of public hospitals in Austria 
first took place in the 1990s, such privatisations have 
rarely occurred since. Privatisation in Bulgaria has led 
to several changes in the law. The law, passed in 1999, 
provided for 72 hospitals to be privatised and in 2002, 
a privatisation moratorium was provisionally imposed. In 
2005, the government started a public debate to resume 
privatisation, but the process stopped because of concerns 
about a lack of transparency in the privatisation process. 
The then Minister of Health declared that until the end of 
2015, the New Law for Medical Institutions would accept 
the possibility of privatisation of some state-owned 
hospitals, with preferential shares for the staff. This plan 
was withdrawn later in the year due to a lack of political 
support. Up until 2015 the only privatisations taking 
place concern the sale of parks, gardens and surrounding 
facilities at hospitals, with the objective of paying the 
debts of the clinics.
There have also been cases in which privatised hospitals 
have been reclaimed by public authorities. This was the 
case for example in Austria, where a public hospital in 
Kitzbühel was sold to a private investor in 2001, but was 
taken back by the public authorities after a five-year 
period when part of the hospital was withdrawn from the 
public funding programme.
In the UK, the only privatised NHS hospital to be operated 
by a private company (Hinchingbrooke Hospital) had 
financial difficulties and was operating with a substantial 
deficit. So part of the rationale for the privatisation was to 
improve the hospital’s finances. A contract with healthcare 
provider CircleHealth began in February 2012. But on 31 
March 2015, CircleHealth withdrew from the contract and 
the hospital returned to NHS control, with CircleHealth 
explaining that the contract terms were no longer viable.
Public–private partnerships (PPPs)
PPPs can be considered as a sort of ‘functional 
privatisation’ (Schulten and Böhlke, 2012) with different 
degrees of responsibility and risk. The decision on the 
most appropriate PPP option depends on the capacity 
of the public sector to regulate and control the quality 
of care, the hospital’s needs and circumstances, and the 
public consensus on the need for reform (Taylor and Blair, 
2002).
In many of the countries analysed in this research, there 
are no official data about the number of PPPs because 
this information is not included in official statistics. In 
Italy, a study by Longo et al (2014) matched administrative 
sources with other non-statistical sources. The study 
identified 20 projects from 2002 onwards (14 from 
2005). Between 2005 and 2012, six projects involved 
the participation of private companies in hospital 
management and seven in the construction or renovation 
of facilities.
PPPs are very limited in the Member States from central 
and eastern Europe that were selected for analysis and 
the case studies. Between 2005 and 2011, only four 
partnerships were established in Poland (Książek, 2012). 
This lack of PPPs can be attributed to factors such as 
insufficient regulation, lack of experience of PPPs or lack of 
trust between public and private partners. Some ventures 
have been suspended because the private investor wanted 
more money than the public partner could invest in the 
partnership.
Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the private sector?
24
A similar situation can be found in Estonia, where only 
one health promotion organisation has state investment. 
In Latvia, PPPs were blocked during the austerity period, 
with the 2010 Letter of Intent to the IMF including 
a commitment not to launch PPPs in 2010 and 2011 
(except for concessions where the government assumed 
no risk or liability). In Bulgaria, PPPs can be established 
for a period of 5–35 years, but it is unclear what the actual 
number of PPPs in place is. In Romania, the lack of a clear 
regulatory framework made PPPs unattractive for foreign 
investors.
On the other hand, PPPs are fairly widespread in the UK, 
with over 130 PPP arrangements completed, underway or 
have been approved since 2001. In both Spain and the UK, 
PPPs tend to take the form of private finance initiatives 
(PFIs). In the UK, PFIs involve the private partners designing, 
building and in many cases operating new infrastructure 
with contracts typically lasting 30 years (Atun, 2007). PFIs 
were first applied in Madrid in 2007; they have been also 
developed in Catalonia,17 Castile and Leon, the Balearic 
Islands and Galicia (Alan Salud Mental, 2013; FADSP, 2014a; 
Sánchez Bayle, 2014). A report published in 2014 by the 
Federation of Associations for the Defence of Public Health 
(FADSP) found that the Madrid region had the largest 
number of hospitals with public–private models, including 
the two types (PFI model and administrative concession 
model18) (FADSP, 2014a). In other regions, it is more common 
to apply either model. For instance, in the Valencia region, 
the administrative concession model is commonly used (five 
hospitals have this model). One of the best known examples 
of concession in this region is the hospital at Alzira that 
applied administrative concession processes back in 1999, 
setting a good example for other privatisation models to 
follow.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the return (which could 
be classified as a concession) in Portugal in 2013 of the 
management of public hospitals to the Misericórdias 
(charities linked to the Catholic Church). This involved 
those hospitals owned by the Misericórdias during the 
dictatorship and were returned to them on the basis of 
a 10-year (renewable) cooperation agreement between 
the Misericórdias and the Regional Health Administrations. 
Currently, three hospitals have been returned and have 
agreements.
In Poland, the aim of the few PPPs is to construct, renovate 
and carry out building alterations. While in Portugal, 
construction PPPs involve a 30-year contract that includes 
the design, building and operation of infrastructure 
facilities. In Austria, PPPs are often established with 
private companies co-financing investments such as 
building alterations and extensions. In Estonia, several old 
buildings have been bought and/or renovated by hospitals 
with private owners, but no new hospital buildings have 
been built. In the framework of the Hospital Plan 2007, the 
French government decided to use PPPs as an investment 
tool. Around 24 PPPs were concluded in this framework for 
a total of €613 million. The PPPs established included four 
to build new hospitals or extensions to existing hospitals, 
and eight projects to increase the capacity of existing 
hospitals. In the UK, PPPs entail (in most cases) the 
provision of the physical facilities by the private partner, 
with the NHS in charge of clinical services. In countries 
such as Germany, Portugal and Spain, some PPPs entail 
the provision of clinical services by the private partner 
(European Commission, 2016a).
Management is another area for which PPPs have been 
established. In Austria, a PPP was signed between the 
municipality of Klosterneuburg and a private management 
company to run the town’s hospital. In Portugal, PPPs are 
carried out through a 10-year contract, which includes the 
delivery of services and the management of facilities.
Commissioning, outsourcing and contracting 
out services
In all the countries included in the in-depth review, 
outsourcing is mostly concerned with non-medical 
activities. In Austria and Portugal, for example, outsourcing 
is carried out for catering, cleaning, gardening, laundry 
and security. In Hungary, laundry, catering, energy and 
accounting have been outsourced since the end of the 
1990s. In relation to catering services, the opposite has 
occurred in the Netherlands where some hospitals have 
taken catering back as in-house service, as better nutrition 
helps towards speedier recovery of patients.
Services such as laboratories, dialysis centres, computed 
tomography, complementary diagnostic test and therapies 
have also been outsourced in many countries, for example 
in Latvia, where diagnostic services such as gastroscopy, 
endoscopy and radiology are contracted out. Clinical 
management has also been outsourced in Germany and 
Hungary.
In France, hospitals have outsourced cleaning and catering 
functions since the 1970s; other support functions such as 
IT management were outsourced later. By the end of the 
1990s, hospitals started to contract out healthcare-related 
services such as the sterilisation of medical instruments or 
machine maintenance. However, this does not mean that 
there is a trend of outsourcing of healthcare services from 
the public to the private sector (Pauget et al, 2012).
In England, ancillary services such as laundry and catering 
have been contracted out for many years. Clinical services 
are purchased on behalf of the NHS and can be purchased 
from private or NHS providers and since 2003 some 
routine elective surgery and diagnostic services have been 
procured for NHS patients from private providers. Despite 
17 In Catalonia, health consortia have a particular setting whereby health professionals can form and manage directly the hospitals and the services they provide. 
These entities can become part of the public health service via public procurement.
18 In the Spanish PFIs, the tender winner designs, builds and finances the whole building, including its medical equipment. The winner also provides general services 
such as cleaning, catering, parking and administration, but health assistance services are still provided by public sector personnel. The public administration pays 
a bonus for the maintenance of the facilities (normally for 20 or 30 years) to the private entity. Furthermore, the private entity can also take advantage of other 
owned services such as bars, shops and parking spaces. In the administrative concession model, a private entity becomes responsible for all or part of the services 
offered by a hospital (including health services); the company receives a per capita bonus according to the population assisted (privatisation levels depend on each 
contract).
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the rate of private provision having grown in recent years, 
its provision within the NHS is still low (around 4% of all 
NHS elective operations) (Harrison, 2013).
Although there is no information on the total volume of 
outsourcing in Poland, a study on outsourcing in public 
and private medical centres indicates that outsourcing is 
used for approximately 30% of medical and non-medical 
services. The most frequently outsourced non-medical 
services are sewing, medical clothes (scrubs), laundry, 
medical transport, catering, security and the maintenance 
of medical equipment. The most frequently outsourced 
medical services are laboratory tests, magnetic resonance 
imaging, histopathology examination and pathology 
services (Kieszkowska-Grudny, 2013).
In Italy, the outsourcing of clinical services concerns those 
activities in which cost reduction and the acquisition of 
specialised knowledge was most needed, and ancillary 
services which public healthcare companies consider to 
be of limited strategic importance (Longo et al, 2014). 
Diagnostic and clinical services are less frequently 
outsourced. Among them, the ones that are more often 
outsourced are laboratory tests and nursing care. There 
was an increase in outsourced non-healthcare services 
(laundry, cleaning, canteen, heating) of 4.2% in 2011, 
slightly lower than the 4.6% increase observed between 
2009 and 2010.
Impact on budgets and costs
In countries where private hospitals tend to receive public 
funding, the savings in public budgets derived from an 
increased role for private providers are lower. This is the 
case for instance in Poland, where more than 90% of total 
revenues of all hospitals come from the contracts with 
the National Health Fund. Commercialisation of public 
hospitals does not mean that they change their source 
of funding. A similar situation can be found in Bulgaria, 
where cuts in the National Health Insurance Fund cover 
the expenses of hospitals – including those that are private 
and have a contract.
Corporatised hospitals are allowed to introduce budget 
saving initaives, since those entities that earn more than 
50% of their costs are seen as private. Therefore, their debt 
is not counted towards their country’s debt (as defined 
in the Maastricht Treaty). In order to hide debt, hospitals 
were often organisationally privatised to receive DRG 
payments from still public sources as ‘payment’, making 
them private entities in the eyes of the System of National 
Accounts – and thus Eurostat. This was amended after the 
crisis when Eurostat realised these practices existed and 
issued a revision of the manual on government deficit and 
debt. Since 2010, even pseudo-private entities are counted 
as public as the public sector is liable if they default.
One of the advantages of PPPs for the public sector is that 
they are essentially ‘off the books’; that is, they do not 
require upfront capital expenditure, which in most cases 
means recourse to taxation and/or borrowing. In some 
countries during the economic crisis (but not in direct 
response to it), there was a reliance on PPPs to finance 
hospital investment (Thomson et al, 2014). Following the 
crisis, these schemes were more appealing because of the 
policy objective to keep public finances under control, 
though the policy does mean that trusts incur future 
financial liabilities.
There are, however, a number of problems associated with 
PPPs, including tendering and monitoring transaction 
costs and private partners having more difficulties than 
the public sector in getting funding from financial markets. 
This has an impact on the long term savings incurred 
with PPPs (EPSU, 2014). Other complications associated 
with PPPs include the private sector not always assuming 
risks (or demanding extra payment for doing so), lack 
of transparency, delays and over budgeting (PSIRU 
2014, Hall 2014). While there are experiences in Europe 
and elsewhere showing that PPPs have helped to build 
hospitals within time and budget, this has been achieved 
to the detriment of quality (for example, design features 
that benefit service users more than operators were not 
always incorporated) (McKee et al, 2006). Research carried 
out by the European Agency for Health and Consumers 
and the Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing 
in Health illustrates that there is no evidence to show 
PPPs are more cost effective than public provision, with 
evidence from Spain and the UK showing that their total 
costs may actually be higher (Schwiertz, 2016). Audit 
reports in Portugal identified missed deadlines during the 
adjudication process of PPPs and showed that government 
spending exceeded the initially estimated amount in four 
PPP hospitals (Tribunal de Contas, 2009, 2013).
A similar situation can be found in Austria, with the 
Accident Hospital of Linz (UKH Linz) having a PPP 
with a private investor (VAMED) that was dissolved as 
a consequence of increasing costs in the wake of the PPP. 
Another public hospital company in Austria (KAGes in 
Styria) sold its hospital’s infrastructure to a subsidiary 
company in order to cover debts, but now has to pay rent 
for its former premises. The company that now owns 
the premises had to charge money for that transaction, 
meaning it has to pay interest (News.at, 2014).
A study in Italy found that the amount of public funding 
agreed at the beginning of a project is often revised 
upwards during its implementation (Longo et al, 2014). 
In some cases, the actual cost of structures doubled the 
amount of public funding initially agreed. In France, the 
Accounts Chamber noted that:
 PPP proceedings had been established in haste;
 the benefits given to PPPs had been poorly exploited;
 financial issues had been insufficiently taken into 
account.
According to the Accounts Chamber, PPPs are not an 
effective way to make savings in public budgets (Cour des 
comptes, 2014).
When comparing the efficiency of the hospitals or the 
quality of services they provide, it is important to take into 
account differences in the budgets allocated.
In France, public and non-profit hospitals receive 
additional funding for research and teaching activities, 
and for the provision of emergency and organ transplant 
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services. Furthermore, DRG payments to for-profit 
hospitals are lower than for public and non-profit 
hospitals. This difference is justified on the basis of 
differences in the size of facilities, the DRG mix and the 
patient population (Durand-Zaleski, 2013). In 2013, the 
French government decided to reduce the amount paid 
for medical treatments to public hospitals by 0.83% and 
to private hospitals by 0.21%. In 2014, private hospitals 
received 0.24% less for medical treatments, while the 
amount allocated to public hospitals remained stable. For 
2015, the government decided to reduce the tariffs by 2.5% 
for private hospitals and 1% for public hospitals.
A report critical of privatisation in Spain by FADSP 
highlighted that budgets for hospitals managed by the 
public sector are lower than for the private sector. For 
example, it is stated that in 2010 the average budget per 
bed/per year was €277,375 in direct management centres 
and €434,686 in privately managed hospitals (FADSP, 
2014b). Other reports provide an estimate with fewer 
differences in the budget, with a cost per bed of €322,963 
per year in hospitals directly managed by the public 
sector and €318,489 in hospitals with other management 
forms (IASIST, 2011). This is linked to the fact that public 
hospitals in Spain are bigger (they have 71% more beds) 
and have more personnel (82% more) than the other types 
of hospitals in Spain.
The Alzira Hospital has been criticised in different reports, 
mainly by trade unions. The hospital was built in 1998 
and ended up losing €2.67 million in its first four years of 
business. The contract said that the company should bear 
any economic losses but it was the regional government 
who paid for the losses and debts (Fundación 1 Mayo, 
2013; Sánchez Bayle, 2014).
In contrast, the Bulgaria National Association of Private 
Hospitals states that the Ministry of Health is not signing 
contracts with private hospitals for certain medical 
activities and that they receive only part of the funding 
in most clinical paths or in emergency care, while the 
debts of public hospitals have been repaid from the State 
budget.
Studies about the situation in the UK argue that rather 
than the market mechanisms resulting in cost savings, 
adding up the direct and indirect costs shows that the 
marketisation of the NHS has cost more than if the 
NHS had provided the services directly (Paton, 2014). 
Furthermore, the private financing of NHS hospitals 
results in trusts having to spend a larger amount of their 
budget on capital developments (Hellowell, 2014). In 
2012, the National Audit Office (NAO) published an initial 
report about the contracting arrangements and the early 
operation of the contract at the only hospital privatised 
so far. The report noted that the proposed savings were 
‘unprecedented’ as a percentage of annual turnover. It also 
noted that, while improvements had been made to some 
areas of clinical performance, CircleHealth had generated 
a larger deficit than the financial plan specified. The NAO 
concluded that a number of financial challenges remained 
to be addressed (NAO, 2012, p. 9).
Views on private provision of 
hospital services
The studies gathered in the countries analysed indicate 
support for provision by public health services and 
a reticence to further involvement of the private sector.
In France, a survey carried out in 2012 for the public 
hospital federation shows that a large majority of French 
citizens (86%) have a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ opinion of public 
hospitals (TNS Sofres, 2012). According to a similar survey 
conducted for the private hospital federation in 2014, private 
hospitals have a very good reputation among citizens (Ipsos, 
2014). Regarding the quality of care in private hospitals, 89% 
of the interviewees thought it was ‘good’. Private hospitals 
differ markedly in their ability to offer hospitality and quality 
of stay (recognised by 89%) and to be swift in the care of 
patients (77%). Approximately 80% of those interviewed 
thought that private hospitals played an important role in 
the French health system and 24% that they were essential. 
However, people believe that public hospitals are more 
likely to guarantee equality of all patients with regard to 
access to care.
In Hungary, negative views of private providers led to 
protests against the acquisition of a public hospital in 
Eger by a private group (Hospinvest Zrt.). In March 2008, 
a referendum was held about user charges, which were 
rejected. As a consequence, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development decided to sell its share of 
the hospital in March 2009 and Hospinvest went bankrupt in 
the same year.
According to a report by the Spanish Ministry of Health, the 
degree of satisfaction with the functioning of the public 
healthcare system was determined to be 6.4 points out of 
10. Concerning the hospitalisation of patients, the data show 
that 63.5% of those surveyed preferred public services over 
private (Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, 
2014). In 2015, the State Agency for the Evaluation of Public 
Policies and Quality of Services (AEVAL) published a report 
on the quality of public services, which included data on 
citizens’ opinion about the health system. This report, 
which shows citizens’ satisfaction level with public health 
centres and hospitals, found that since 1995 more than half 
of those surveyed have been ‘very or quite satisfied’ with 
public health services. The only exceptions were satisfaction 
levels with hospitals in 2013 and 2014, where 47.8% of those 
surveyed were ‘very or quite satisfied’ with services provided 
in public hospitals. In both cases (health centres and 
hospitals), satisfaction levels experienced a considerable 
decrease between 2011 and 2014 (AEVAL, 2015).
In Italy, a survey asked 1,200 people about their views on 
the Italian health system. According to this study, citizens 
complain about a shrinking of the public service which can 
hamper the accessibility of the National Health Service. In 
particular, people living in regions that are implementing 
the greatest cuts in the number of beds were the ones 
more likely to perceive a worsening of public health and 
more likely to seek healthcare outside their region. Those 
interviewed also complained about the wastage and weak 
managerial competences deriving from a very close relation 
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between politics and the management of health services 
(Fondazione Censis Cergas-Bocconi, 2012).
In Poland, 64.5% of respondents to a survey conducted in 
2013 claimed that the privatisation of hospitals was not 
good for patients because it could lead to limited access to 
healthcare services, and 74% of respondents did not want 
their hospital to be privatised. Public healthcare in Poland 
is perceived as a special type of public service which should 
remain public (Nowyszpital, 2014).
In a consultative referendum initiated by the Vienna local 
authority in 2013, around 87% of participants voted against 
the privatisation of public utilities operated by the city of 
Vienna, including public hospitals (Der Standard, 2013).
In a 2009 survey in Bulgaria, due to the willingness of a local 
authority to establish PPPs, 44% of those interviewed said 
they were against private healthcare. The same survey found 
that 65% of Bulgarians believed corruption was widespread 
in the public healthcare sector – slightly higher than the 
EU12 average of 54%, but approximately the same as the 
corruption perceived in other public sector domains.
This public opposition has been one of the reasons why, in 
some cases, planned privatisations have not gone ahead. 
In Hungary, Poland and Spain, public opposition has been 
a deterrent for local authorities (which own most of public 
hospitals) to transform public hospitals into commercial 
companies.
Social partners
Overall, the information gathered shows that trade unions 
have been critical of privatisation processes and have 
proactively opposed them with protests and strikes (Poland 
and Portugal).
In the UK, research by the Unite union indicated that around 
a quarter of the board members of clinical commissioning 
groups had links to private sector companies (Unite, 2015). 
The report argued that this represented a clear conflict of 
interest for people who were involved in the commissioning 
of services for the NHS.
PPPs have been the subject of criticism by the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), which noted 
that PPPs do not necessarily bring savings for the public 
sector or a transfer of risks to the private sector. EPSU 
also called for a comparison of PPPs with public sector 
alternatives (Hall, 2008).
Some of the issues raised by trade unions across Europe 
include:
 reductions in the number of health professionals after 
privatisation (Poland, Portugal, Spain);
 reductions in the number of beds (Italy);
 worsening of working conditions (France, Germany, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK);
 negative impact on the quality of services (France, Italy, 
Poland, UK);
 failure and negative consequences of private 
management models (France, Spain);
 negative consequences for the needs and/or equal 
treatment of patients (Austria, Germany, UK).
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4 Main findings of the 
literature review
This systematic literature review scrutinises the 
consequences of the involvement of private providers 
in delivering hospital services in terms of efficiency, 
quality and accessibility of services compared with public 
providers.
Although the review was designed on the basis of 
the guidelines for a systematic review, it had to make 
concessions on the breadth and/or depth of the process – 
also referred to as a rapid evidence assessment (REA) 
(Grant and Booth, 2009). The initial aim was to aggregate 
the evidence to answer the review question. However, the 
heterogeneity of the studies under review meant that the 
synthesis puts more emphasis on providing an overview of 
the evidence while taking into account the quality of the 
papers. Moreover, it follows realist review methodology 
since it does not evaluate a simple intervention, but rather 
an event which is embedded in a complex system. Hence, 
the ambition is to unravel how it works, for whom it works, 
under which circumstances and to what extent (Pawson 
et al, 2005). This means that the aim of this REA was not 
to seek a dichotomous answer, but to acknowledge that 
complex systems require complex answers.
This systematic review follows the definitions provided 
in Chapter 1 and looks at the three healthcare indicators 
(efficiency, accessibility and quality of care) and the 
various types of private hospitals (for-profit, private non-
profit and PPPs). Accessibility and quality of care cover 
many different aspects of healthcare that cannot be easily 
be defined. Throughout the selection process, a broad 
interpretation of the two concepts was upheld to ensure 
that important and relevant papers were not excluded 
from the review.
The methodology of the systematic aggregation and 
appraisal is outlined in the Annex.
Prior research: Systematic reviews
Many researchers have carried out systematic reviews on 
the impact of private players in the healthcare sector. This 
systematic literature review is – to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge – the first that specifically reviews the delivery 
of healthcare in terms of accessibility, quality of care 
and efficiency by comparing public and private hospital 
services within the European Union.
This section provides a brief (non-exhaustive) summary 
of the systematic reviews published in peer-reviewed 
literature.
North America
Although this review adopts the tradition of Eggleston et al 
(2008), their study focused only on the USA and on quality 
of care using mortality rates and other patient outcomes 
(such as surgical complications and medical errors) as 
indicators. Their final assessment was that for-profit 
and public hospitals have a weaker performance than 
non-profit hospitals. However, they emphasised that the 
direction of the effect depends on the data source, region 
and time.
In an earlier study, Devereaux et al (2002) conducted 
a similar exercise with a systematic review and meta-
analysis in the USA, comparing the mortality rates of 
for-profit and non-profit hospitals. They found that for-
profit hospitals had significantly higher mortality rates of. 
Deveraux et al (2004) continued their review approach and 
found that for-profit hospitals charged higher payments 
for their services than non-profit hospitals. One of the 
acknowledged reasons was that for-profit hospitals have 
to generate revenues for their stakeholder and this might 
drive up costs. Furthermore, they argued that it is likely 
they had underestimated the results because they had not 
controlled for case-mix differences and thus ‘upcoding’19 
practices might not have been captured in the analysis.20
International
Most systematic reviews and studies focusing specifically 
on hospitals and ownership come from the USA. 
Nonetheless, the systematic reviews discussed in this 
section try to look beyond existing US research papers, 
although none of them looks only at the EU.
One international systematic review provided an overview 
of other systematic reviews, focusing on ownership 
structures and the performance of for-profit, non-profit 
and public healthcare providers (Herrera et al, 2014). 
It concluded that for-profit providers underperform in 
relation to mortality rates and payments compared with 
non-profit healthcare providers. But regarding further 
quality indicators, no absolute answer on the differences 
could be given. Likewise for the comparison between non-
profit and for-profit with the public sector, no conclusive 
answer was given.
Another systematic review examined five performance 
measures; efficiency, quality of care, innovation, trust and 
value driven (Heins et al, 2010). For quality of care and 
trust, the results were more favourable for non-profit than 
for for-profit healthcare services, whereas it was unclear 
for efficiency and innovation. Yet more is written about 
efficiency.
19 This means that patients are misclassified in the DRG system in order to maximise the profit per patient.
20 Note that the other (well-known) systematic reviews are excluded from this description because they only compare for-profit and non-profit institutions.
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The majority of the systematic reviews come to the 
conclusion that the findings are inconsistent, meaning that 
the direction/significance of efficiency of private hospitals 
differs between the papers included in the review. 
Hollingsworth (2003) reviewed evidence on efficiency 
between different providers in the healthcare sector. This 
review included a specific section on the provision of 
hospital services and incorporates the following specific 
note in its findings:
The results, both that public provision seems in general 
more efficient, and that European hospitals have higher 
average efficiency, may reflect many confounding factors, 
including methodological differences between studies, 
differences in models […] or sample sizes [...] impacting 
upon robustness and validity. Results are conditional upon 
basic differences in study design and samples, rather than 
any real variation in efficiency, meaning it is difficult to 
compare results beyond looking at generalities.
(Hollingsworth, 2003, p. 1113)
This argument is in line with Sibbel and Nagarajah (2012), 
who argue in their systematic review which focuses on 
Germany and the USA, that methodological issues were 
partly the reason why different results had been found.
A similar review that focuses primarily on Germany, but 
includes Italian and US articles as well, argues that no 
straightforward conclusion can be made that for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals are more (cost and technical) efficient 
than public hospitals (Tiemann et al, 2012). In addition, 
contrasting findings were found for Germany, partly 
attributed to the differences in research design; some of 
the stronger and more current papers found that public 
hospitals are more efficient than their counterparts.
Synthesis
The objective of this synthesis is to identify and explain 
the consequences of private delivery of services compared 
with public hospitals. The topic on efficiency can be 
synthesised in a more aggregative fashion,21 meaning 
that it tries to add up the findings while still following the 
realist approach and trying to avoid extrapolation from the 
context. The articles on quality of care and accessibility 
are synthesised in an interpretive (configurative) manner, 
aiming to provide different perspectives and insights on 
the broader picture (Booth et al, 2012). The goal is to map 
the various indicators used to examine accessibility and 
quality of care, rather than to add them up to extract one 
answer.
Efficiency
The results are diverse. No clear-cut message can be 
derived from the results, which is in line with the reviews 
conducted before. However, it seems that the institutional 
context is of great importance. When the private sector 
is incentivised to reduce costs (not merely to maximise 
the profit) in conjunction with an incentive mechanism 
for public hospitals to work efficiently, the differences 
between public and private hospitals related to ownership 
seem to decrease or even dissolve. Many studies find the 
kind of reimbursement scheme in place to be one of the 
main drivers for the diverging findings.
All the efficiency measures use an input-oriented Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and/or Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) analysis. The only exception is Barbetta et al 
(2007), who justified the output orientation because Italy 
was coping with waiting list problems and this was made 
a priority.
After introducing the DRG-based payment system in 
Italy, non-profit hospitals seem to have converged to 
the same mean level of technical efficiency as the public 
hospitals (Barbetta et al, 2007). Another study found that 
for-profit hospitals in Italy (Lazio Regio) suffered from 
more technical inefficiency than the public and non-
profit hospitals, whereas non-profit hospitals were more 
inefficient than public hospitals (Daidone and D’Amico, 
2009). The study’s authors argued that for-profit hospitals 
use their resources less efficiently, which might be because 
these private hospitals are confronted with regulations 
that set a limit on their funded admissions and, since this 
limit fluctuates, private hospitals might face problems 
in adjusting their input resources accordingly (Daidone 
and D’Amico, 2009). Berta et al (2010) argued along the 
same lines by revealing that for-profit hospitals were less 
efficient than their counterparts but converged towards 
the same efficiency level over time (1998–2007), while non-
profit hospitals were already on the same efficiency level 
as public hospitals from the beginning of the study period.
Another indicator for efficiency is the practice of upcoding 
(registering patients with complications that are not 
present to increase the reimbursement). Vittadini et 
al (2012) found evidence that non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals in Italy were engaged in the practice of upcoding 
before a specific law against it was established in 2007. 
No such evidence was found against public hospitals. To 
support this argument, Berta et al (2010) found that for-
profit hospitals in Italy had higher upcoding practices than 
other hospitals during the period 2003–2005.
In Germany, the DRG system was introduced in 2004; this, 
in principle, incentivises hospitals to reduce the length 
of stay. Herr et al (2011) found no significant difference 
between costs or technical efficiency between for-profit 
and public hospitals after the reform. In 2008, Herr argued 
that private hospitals were (on average) significantly 
less costly and technically efficient. The reason for these 
diverging results lies in a change of the remuneration 
system that resulted in no incentive to increase the length 
of stay to raise revenue.
In contradiction of this evidence, three papers found that 
public hospitals in Germany were more efficient than for-
profit hospitals even after 2004 (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 
2009; Herwartz and Strumann, 2011; Lindlbauer and 
Schreyögg, 2014). To add an extra dimension to these 
21 There are two ways to approach a systematic review. The first one is aggregation, which means that it adds up the findings, implying a certain homogeneity among 
the research reviewed. The second one, configuration, is more about arranging the findings and providing an interpretive, conceptual mapping; the findings tend 
to be more heterogeneous (Gough et al, 2012).
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findings, Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009) identified that 
for-profit hospitals with over 1,000 beds operated more 
efficiently than their counterparts. Thus, the size of the 
hospital seems to matter. Furthermore, when quality 
of care is taken into account, the efficiency differences 
seemed to decrease (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009). 
Also, non-profit hospitals were found to be less efficient 
(Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg, 
2014). However, use of the two different measurements 
(DEA and SFA) by Herwartz and Strumann (2011) seemed 
to cause inconsistent efficiency results for the non-profit 
hospitals after 2004.
Looking at the process of privatisation, researchers have 
derived different conclusions, showing that hospitals that 
converted to for-profit status increased their efficiency; 
they were able to obtain efficiency gains by reducing 
labour inputs and expenditures on supplies. Non-profit 
hospitals initially show an increase in efficiency but later 
this advantage dissolves. This might be an indicator 
that the change of efficiency after privatisation is rather 
transitory than permanent for non-profit hospitals 
(Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). This study also discovered 
that, within the DRG payment system, the efficiency gains 
were significantly lower than when the DRG payment 
system was not in place (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2012). 
Lastly, in the German context, Schwierz (2011) found that 
the reform in 2004 provided incentives for private hospitals 
to take over public hospitals even in markets with 
declining demand. In general, for-profit hospitals were 
found to be faster in responding to increasing demand 
than non-profit hospitals and public hospitals.
Austria and Germany both have a DRG system, but in 
Austria the DRG system (by law) only covers up to 50% of 
the hospital’s costs (in most federal states even less); the 
other costs are funded by operational deficit coverage 
which is determined by the local authorities based on 
actual results. The remaining costs are left to the hospital. 
One article found that, in Austria, non-profit hospitals 
seemed to operate significantly more efficiently than 
public hospitals (Czypionka et al, 2014). Taking the 
differences between Germany and Austria into account, 
a difference in financial risks occurs between the public 
and private hospitals, because the federal state will cover 
any remaining costs by the public hospital, whereas the 
non-profit hospitals need to cover the additional costs 
themselves. Hence, public and private hospitals are 
exposed to different risks in the DRG system in Austria, 
while Germany has a system that treats the different 
ownership types more equally. This could explain the 
differences in the results between the two countries.
Lastly, in the case of Portugal, evidence from Barros et al 
(2013) indicated that private hospitals were more efficient 
than public hospitals. However, this finding should be 
interpreted with care due to the relatively small sample 
size and because no distinction was made between for-
profit and non-profit hospitals.
Table 5 provides an overview of the technical and cost 
efficiency of for-profit and non-profit private hospitals 
compared with public hospitals.
The findings differ regarding the relationship between 
ownership and length of stay.22 When various relevant 
confounders (especially the type and number of 
diagnoses) are controlled for, the length of stay in private 
treatment centres23 in the UK is shorter than in public 
hospitals (Siciliani et al, 2013). This corresponds with 
a finding in Italy whereby the length of stay for aortic 
valve substitution was shorter in private hospitals 
(Fattore et al, 2014). However, it was found to be longer in 
inpatient private psychiatric hospitals since they have less 
coordination with community mental health services than 
public hospitals (Gigantesco et al, 2009).
Table 5: Comparison of technical and cost efficiency between private and public hospitals
More efficient Less efficient No difference
For-profit Tiemann and Schreyögg (2012), 
Germany (after privatisation)
Lindlbauer and Schreyögg (2014), Germany
Herwartz and Strumann (2012), Germany
Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009), Germany
Herr (2008), Germany
Daidone and D’Amico (2009), Italy
Herr et al (2011), Germany
Berta et al (2010), Italy
Non-profit Czypionka et al (2014), Austria Lindlbauer and Schreyögg (2014), Germany
Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009), Germany
Herr (2008), Germany
Tiemann and Schreyögg (2012), 
Germany after privatisation
Daidone and D’Amico (2009), Italy
Barbetta et al (2007), Italy
Berta et al (2010), Italy
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
22 The length of stay can also be interpreted as a quality measure; based upon expert advice, it is categorised as an efficiency indicator. Also, it is not clear what the 
optimal length of stay is. For simplification, a relatively shorter length of stay is interpreted as a more efficient organisation.
23 Treatment centres are smaller hospitals that specialise in a limited number of medical procedures.
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In Greece, the adjusted length of stay was higher in private 
hospitals (Kondilis et al, 2011). This is, to a certain extent, 
surprising because the authors mention that they would 
expect longer lengths of stay due to the more complex 
cases in public hospitals. Nonetheless, they acknowledge 
that ‘international empirical evidence has shown that 
hospital reimbursement on a daily basis creates incentives 
for private profit maximising hospitals to increase length 
of patient stay, longer than medically required’ (Kondilis et 
al, 2011).
All in all, the impact of ownership on the length of stay 
differs in how far the institutional context incentivises the 
economic benefit of the length of stay.
Summary: Efficiency
The findings provide mixed results with a number of 
contrasting findings that go against the widespread 
economic reasoning that private provision is more 
efficient than public. Yet, the overarching message from 
all the papers is that the hospital financing scheme is of 
importance in how far the private sector outperforms 
the public sector, or the other way around. Most papers 
mention that the institutional context might be the limiting 
factor for private hospitals to be efficient, or that their 
objectives are not necessarily set to increase efficiency 
but to increase revenue/profit; other papers assign it to 
organisational inappropriateness. The results indicate 
that, with an institutional framework that provides private 
and public hospitals with equal incentives, the differences 
in efficiency seem to converge. Table 5 provides 
a schematic overview of the findings looking at technical 
efficiency. Finally, the findings suggest that the process of 
privatisation (at least in the short term for non-profit) is 
positively related to an increase of technical efficiency, as 
in the case of Germany.
Accessibility
The selected articles examine different indicators of 
accessibility.24 Since the outcome variables cannot be 
aggregated, an overview of the various indicators is given 
and discussed by country.
Patients’ characteristics can be an indicator of differences 
in accessibility between public and private hospitals. In 
Greece, monthly family income is positively related to 
admission to private hospitals. In addition, less complex 
patients are more likely to use private hospitals (patients 
who are younger and with better mental health status) 
(Pappa and Niakas, 2006). Furthermore, for-profit hospitals 
charge more for users falling under the Greek Social Health 
Insurance fund who have, on average, a higher payment 
per discharge, than public hospitals (Kondilis et al, 2011).
Three articles on accessibility come from France. 
Gusmano et al (2014) used the number of patients whose 
admission can be prevented with adequate access to 
primary healthcare to assess the disparities in accessibility 
to healthcare, with emphasis on revascularisation 
procedures. They argued that public hospitals have 
a higher proportion of people with inadequate access 
to (primary) healthcare than private hospitals.25 One 
of the reasons given is that public hospitals generally 
have a more difficult case-mix, although the authors 
also highlight that the public and private sectors 
have different roles in the French healthcare system. 
Interestingly, the risk of revascularisation is much higher 
in for-profit hospitals than in public hospitals. They 
explain that revascularisation procedures can be more 
or less standardised and most of the treatments are not 
considered complex (Gusmano et al, 2014).
The second study looked to see if there was a significant 
difference between hospital types in terms of access to 
renal (kidney) transplantation (Riffaut et al, 2015). The 
authors observed that for-profit hospitals were less likely 
to have someone on the preemptive registration list 
than (public) academic hospitals. This means that there 
is an equity issue to access preemptive transplantation 
related to ownership, while preemptive transplantation 
is associated with a longer survival of the patient. 
Hence, the patients in for-profit hospitals are apparently 
disadvantaged in accessing this treatment.
The third article reflects on the differences in access to 
expensive drugs between public and private hospitals. 
Bonastre et al (2014) identified no significant difference 
between public and private hospitals in France in relation 
to the use of expensive drugs (anti-cancer drugs) after 
controlling for case-mix. This finding is related to the 
introduction of a list containing expensive hospitals 
drugs – an extension of the DRG system – to ensure access 
to innovation and to harmonise the accessibility of public 
hospitals to expensive products.
In Italy, the characteristics of patients seem to differ 
between private and public (psychiatric) hospitals, with 
fewer young and unemployed citizens making use of 
private services, as well as fewer complex cases (similar 
to the findings in Greece). One of the reasons given for 
the differences is that the private sector is not allowed 
to admit patients compulsorily and is better tailored to 
patients requiring long-term supportive services. ‘In this 
respect, the public and private sectors function partially as 
a mixed-balanced and complementary system’ (Preti et al, 
2009, p. 493).
Another paper found that more non-resident patients (in 
the region) are admitted to private hospitals than to public 
hospitals (Fattore et al, 2014). In other words, patients had 
a higher chance of being admitted to private hospitals 
when they could not gain access to care in their own 
region. The authors point out that this is of concern since 
those with sufficient financial resources can afford to be 
more mobile. Furthermore, for-profit hospitals have been 
24 The quality of the articles seems to be lower than the articles analysing efficiency, according to the appraisal criteria. Therefore, the decision to include the articles 
covering accessibility after the appraisal was less strict than for the articles on efficiency.
25 This is measured based on the discharge rates of ambulatory care sensitive conditions; that is, chronic conditions (for example, diabetes and hypertension) for 
which it is possible to prevent the need for hospital admission by active management such as through vaccination or lifestyle changes (Naylor et al, 2015).
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accused of being more involved in the selection of more 
profitable patients than public or non-profit hospitals 
(Berta et al, 2010).
Looking at a specific case, Preti et al (2010) detected that 
private psychiatric facilities were significantly less likely 
to admit patients who had attempted suicide prior to 
admission; this might serve as an indicator that a high-risk 
group is less able to access private psychiatric services.
Finally, in the UK, private clinics (Independent sector 
treatment centres, ISTCs) treat less complex patients 
compared with the NHS, such as patients with fewer 
diagnoses, patients exposed to fewer prior procedures 
and those less likely to come from deprived residential 
areas (Mason et al, 2010). The authors argued that a fair 
reimbursement system should be in place that takes into 
account these differences. They also called for better 
reporting quality from the private sector, which was (in 
general) perceived to be worse than their counterparts. 
Furthermore, it was reported that public hospital users 
were (in general) just as satisfied with the accessibility 
of healthcare as patients in private hospitals (Owusu-
Frimpong et al, 2010).
Table 6 provides an overview of the findings on 
accessibility indicators.
Summary: Accessibility
The outcomes from the articles under review are specific 
and use different indicators (Table 6). Nevertheless, 
the majority of the articles raise concerns about the 
accessibility of private hospitals; most of them highlight 
this issue by analysing the complexity of the cases and 
various patients’ characteristics. Users from higher 
socioeconomic classes in particular seem to have better 
access to private hospitals. For further research, the 
themes that come up are differences in the characteristics 
of users (socioeconomic status), cost of medicines, and 
differences in admission and mobility.
Quality of care
Quality of care encompasses many different aspects of 
healthcare and the indicators of quality of care have a wide 
scope, reflected in the variety of outcome variables found 
in this review.
The indicator of caesarean sections is used in only two 
papers.26 The rate of caesarean sections might also 
Table 6: Overview of accessibility indicators
Country Type (private) Impact* Outcome/indicator
France For-profit Negative: For-profit hospitals are less likely to have 
someone on the preemptive registration list
Access to preemptive 
registration
Italy Psychiatric Negative: Patients who had attempted suicide prior 
to admission were less likely to be admitted to private 
psychiatric facilities
Admission
France Not specified Negative: Public hospitals have a higher proportion of 
people with inadequate access to (primary) healthcare 
than private hospitals
Avoidable hospitalisation
Greece Not specified Negative: Monthly family income is positively related to 
admission to private hospitals
Utilisation by socioeconomic 
class
UK ISTCs Negative: Patients with fewer diagnoses, patients with 
fewer prior procedures and those less likely to come 
from deprived residential areas are treated in ISTCs
Patient complexity
Italy Not specified Positive: More non-resident patients (in the region) are 
admitted to private hospitals
Regional physical mobility
Italy Psychiatric Negative: Fewer young, complex cases and unemployed 
citizens make use of private services
Characteristics of patients
France For-profit No difference Mean expenditure and usage of 
drugs
UK Not specified No difference Perception accessibility
Greece For-profit Negative: Lower bed capacity Bed capacity
Greece For-profit Positive: Lower occupancy rate Occupancy rate
Greece For-profit Negative: Higher payment per discharge than public 
hospitals
Payment per discharge
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
Note: * The direction of the effect is standardised to evaluate what kind of impact private hospitals have on the service delivery compared with public 
hospitals. This assessment does not necessarily correspond to the direction of the outcome variable.
26 It is unclear what the rate of caesarean sections entails: does a high rate indicate better or poor quality of care? However, in the context of developed healthcare 
systems, caesarean sections are still associated with a higher risk of mortality. An increase in the usage of caesarean sections seems unjustified and inappropriate 
in some cases and therefore in this synthesis interpreted as poor quality of care if there are more caesarean sections in one hospital than another. Note that this 
may fall under the topic of efficiency or accessibility as well.
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be an indicator of quality of care; two studies in Spain 
found a higher rate of caesarean sections performed in 
private maternity units, controlling for at least age and 
socioeconomic status (Salvador et al, 2009; Río et al, 
2010).27 To be more specific, in private hospitals the risk 
was higher for immigrants, except for east European 
women, while in the public hospitals, immigrant women 
had a lower risk, except for Latin American women (Río 
et al, 2010). The differences between caesarean sections 
between immigrant and native women could be connected 
to the fact that immigrant women have, on average, higher 
perinatal mortality.
Pérotin et al (2013) and Owusu-Frimpong et al (2010) both 
examine patients’ experiences in the UK. The findings 
of Owusu-Frimpong et al indicate that private users of 
independent treatment centres have higher satisfaction in 
terms of service climate factors, such as getting attention 
from doctors, whereas Pérotin et al did not find significant 
differences between the reported experiences of patients 
between the public and private hospitals. The differences 
found were driven by other variables such as patient 
characteristics.
In general, this review does not address the effect private 
hospitals have on employment conditions. However, 
Kondilis et al (2011) connected it with the quality of care 
whereby the for-profit hospitals in Greece had lower 
occupancy rates, lower staffing rates for nurses, and less 
highly qualified nurses than in the public hospitals. One 
explanation given for the differences in lower staffing rates 
for nurses was that for-profit hospitals need to maximise 
profit and therefore minimise expenditure on nursing staff. 
Another explanation given is that for-profit hospitals use 
nursing staff more efficiently than public facilities.
In Germany, the trade-off between quality of care and 
efficiency was assessed by Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009) 
by analysing mortality rates. They found evidence that 
for-profit hospitals were performing better than the public 
sector by, for example, controlling case-mix differences. 
One of the potential causes for this finding is that due 
to hospital reforms which reduced the information 
asymmetry between the patient and the hospitals, for-
profit hospitals are stimulated to put emphasis on the 
quality of care.
The last four studies discussed in this section come from 
Italy. In a research project on patients’ choice of hospitals 
between 2005 and 2007, it was found that patients in 
private hospitals were less likely to be readmitted in 30 
days or to die within 30 days of discharge, though the 
impact of the latter was found to be much less (Moscone 
et al, 2012). This corresponds, to a certain extent, to the 
results of a multi-level analysis which found that the risk 
of dying was significantly less in private hospitals when 
within hospital variation was taken into account (Berta 
et al, 2013). Findings from the same study highlighted 
that non-profit hospitals had the most readmissions, 
though this might not be a negative thing because it 
could be that ‘patients prefer to move to a hospital with 
a better reputation [..] if they need a readmission and 
were previously discharged from a private hospital’(Berta 
et al, 2010, p. 819). The fourth paper stresses that 
private psychiatric clinics did not collaborate with the 
community system as well the public hospital psychiatric 
department did (Preti et al, 2009). However, there was 
a higher likelihood that patients in private clinics would 
receive follow-up treatment (such as rehabilitation and 
psychotherapy) than patients attending public hospitals.
Table 7 provides an overview of the findings of quality of 
care indicators.
Table 7: Overview of quality of care indicators
Country Number of 
studies
Type (private) Impact Outcome/indicator
Spain 2 Not specified Negative: Higher rates in private maternity 
units
Caesarean section rates
Italy 1 Psychiatric Negative: Poorer collaboration with the 
community system and higher likelihood for 
follow-up treatment by private psychiatric 
care
Patterns of care and discharges
UK 1 ISTC No difference Patients’ experiences
UK 1 Not specified Positive: Higher satisfaction regarding 
service climate factors
Patients’ experiences
Germany, Italy 2 Non-profit and 
for-profit
Positive: Lower mortality rate and lower risk 
of dying
Mortality
Italy 1 Not specified Positive: Less likely to be readmitted within 
30 days
Readmission
Greece 1 For-profit Negative: Lower staffing rate Nursing staff rate
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
27 Salvador et al (2009) has one important confounder – birth weight, and it is very context-specific to Madrid. However, together with the article by Río et al (2010), 
the article has sufficient credibility and legitimacy to be included in the synthesis.
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Summary: Quality of care
The overall outcome was relatively mixed, with no 
consistent relationship found (Table 7). The results differ 
between finding a negative relationship (four articles), 
a positive relationship (four articles) and no significant 
relationship (one article).
Discussion
This REA attempted to fill a knowledge gap by providing 
a descriptive synthesis of the literature on private hospital 
services available in the EU Member States. The intention 
was to make it as objective and inclusive as possible.
Special attention should be given to the measurement of 
efficiency, as technical efficiency and cost efficiency are of 
major interest in this review. The most applied measures 
are SFA and DEA. SFA assumes an existing productivity 
function and the error term reflects inefficiency and 
random factors; DEA is derived from deviations from the 
best practice frontier and the random term solely reflects 
the inefficiency, but does not assume a productivity 
function. There is academic debate on the correct 
methodology (for example, Skinner, 1994). Because there 
is no consensus on this matter, both measurements are 
considered eligible. This approach was also adopted by 
Hollingsworth (2003), Tiemann et al (2012), and Varabyova 
and Schreyögg (2013) who all include both DEA and SFA 
methods in their overview and systematic review.
The general assessment, particularly with the research 
on the concepts of accessibility and quality of care, 
is that a wide range of indicators were used and the 
methodologies varied substantially. The methodology 
and the data were not without their weaknesses and 
this makes it problematic to extrapolate or generalise 
the findings. Most of the findings of the two concepts 
were very context, disease and/or indicator specific. The 
articles covering efficiency showed considerably more 
consistency in their use of indicators and methodology. 
Nevertheless, the findings were inconsistent and specific 
to the methodology or context. Schlesinger and Gray 
(2006) mention a very valid criticism that ‘much apparent 
inconsistencies in the effect of ownership emerge when 
scholars carelessly combine findings based on different 
health services or performance measures’ (Schlesinger 
and Gray, 2006, p. 289).
Another concern is that the countries represented 
in the studies include only a limited number of EU 
Member States, with the majority of the research being 
conducted in Germany and Italy. Therefore, including 
articles that were not written in English would be the 
next step to identify potential alternative research on this 
matter. Furthermore, for some indicators, such as LOS, 
readmission and caesarean sections, it is difficult to assess 
what is meant in relation to the appropriateness of care. 
Also, publication bias and the sensitivity of the search 
string could (potentially) exclude research that might have 
been relevant for this REA. However, there is evidence 
against the existence of publication bias, at least in relation 
to mortality rates and payments for hospital services 
(Devereaux et al, 2002, 2004; Eggleston et al, 2008).
Having noted the challenges and caveats, all the articles 
selected for this review proved valuable in collecting 
information about the different puzzle pieces in order 
to obtain a better overview of what the role of the 
private sector is providing in hospital services in the EU. 
This knowledge can be used as the basis to design an 
institutional framework that regulates and incentivises the 
hospital sector in the most effective manner.
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5 Evidence from the country case 
studies
This chapter presents the information gathered through 
desk research and semi-structured interviews about the 
situation of private hospitals in Austria, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Romania and the UK. The information focuses on the 
delivery of medical services in private hospitals, including 
information about two private hospitals in each country. 
The main themes that emerge from the case studies 
are synthesised by comparing the situation across the 
countries.
Efficiency
While interviewees were asked about both technical 
and cost efficiency, most of the replies focused on the 
latter and on issues related to efficiency. Interviews and 
desk research focused on LOS given that this was one of 
the areas identified in the REA as pertinent for hospital 
ownership.
Cost efficiency
A straightforward calculation of the ‘value for money’ of 
healthcare services purchased by the public sector or by 
private insurers is, in some cases, not possible because 
data about the price paid are commercially confidential so 
as not to affect negotiations (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2006; Irish Medical Times, 2011). These data 
were not available from private hospitals in the Austrian, 
Irish and UK case studies. Some studies managed to 
provide estimates that overcome this lack of data.
A study analysing hip replacements in English hospitals 
(Appleby et al, 2013) measured their cost-effectiveness 
by looking at the cost per quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY), with one QALY equating to one year in perfect 
health. Hospital level costs for hip procedures from the 
National Reference Costs dataset were used to calculate 
the hospital’s cost per QALY, which was found to be at 
an average of £2,100 (€2,395 as at 17 November 2016) 
for public hospitals. As private hospitals do not make 
information on the actual cost per patient/treatment 
public, the average price paid by the NHS to private 
hospitals per operation was used to determine a ‘cost’ per 
QALY value at approximately £1,900 (€2,210). Given the 
for-profit nature of the private sector, it is likely that the 
actual cost is lower than the price per treatment paid by 
the NHS (and hence that actual cost per QALY is lower), 
which may indicate that hip operations in private hospitals 
are carried out with greater efficiency. Regarding ISTCs, the 
Department of Health in England has stated that during 
the first phase of their establishment it paid an average 
premium of 11% above the NHS tariff due, in part, to high 
setup costs. This price constitutes a drop compared with 
previous spot purchases, but according to the House of 
Commons Health Committee, it did not necessarily provide 
better value for money than establishing more NHS 
treatment centres, using the existing ones for additional 
hours, or establishing partnership arrangements (House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2006).
In Ireland, an audit of cost control reviewed the prices of 
contracts with public and private hospitals to establish 
the average price for seven common procedures. The 
audit concluded that most procedures purchased in 
Ireland from private hospitals cost less than the case-
mix adjusted benchmark cost28 (Government of Ireland, 
2009). While the contracted prices in public hospitals were 
approximately 25% lower than in private ones, the prices 
paid did not include staff remuneration (as they receive 
a public salary), making direct comparison difficult. The 
audit also pointed out that public hospital prices are not 
commercially sustainable. Rather than use the prices 
that private hospitals would charge, the Health Service 
Executive looked at activity-based funding and found that, 
for day cases, the prices in the public and private sector 
were broadly comparable (Interview with Health Service 
Executive manager).
Voluntary health insurance in Ireland can be used to obtain 
private care within public hospitals. The average cost per 
2012 admission for private insurance is similar in public 
and private hospitals, around €2,250 (McLoughlin, 2014). 
The interviewee in the non-profit hospital included in this 
research stated that state organisations charge health 
insurers €1,500 per day/per bed, which is more than twice 
what they would charge to their insurers.
Length of stay
Data about the length of stay in public and private 
hospitals can be difficult to compare. For example, in 
Ireland, the Health Research Board publishes length 
of stay data for public hospitals in length categories, 
so there is no continuity in the data and it is difficult to 
make comparisons with private hospitals. Furthermore, 
public hospitals take out of the database those patients 
who stay more than six months, which also complicates 
comparisons. In other countries (for example, Austria), 
there are no data publicly available about the length of 
stay in for-profit hospitals. There are also comparability 
issues across countries: in some DRGs systems, a stay and 
a readmission or follow-up are considered as one stay, 
whereas in others it would be counted as two stays.
Overall, the length of stay in for-profit hospitals in the 
countries analysed in the case studies is shorter than in 
public hospitals for some categories of patients (see Box 3).
28 In this audit, average prices were a percentage of a benchmark price derived from the national hospitals case-mix standard cost index.
Delivering hospital services: A greater role for the private sector?
38
Box 3: Summary of the length of stay in for-profit hospitals
Austria: There are no publicly available data about the length of stay in for-profit hospitals. The average length of stay in 
hospitals funded by the provincial health funds has decreased continuously over the past few years and was 5.7 days in 
2006 (BMGFJ, 2008).
Germany: The average length of stay (7.1 days in 2012 in all types of hospitals) is fairly high compared with other 
OECD countries, even though it has decreased considerably since the introduction of DRGs. The incentives and checks 
associated with DRGs have made the length of stay of different types of hospitals converge (Deutsche Krankenhaus 
Gesellschaft, 2014).
Romania: An analysis of publicly available indicators for clinical efficiency reported by the National School of Public 
Health, Management and Professional Development in Bucharest showed that private hospitals tend to have better 
efficiency ratios than public hospitals, with the average hospital length of stay being generally lower.
Ireland: The average length of stay in public hospitals in 2012 was longer than in private ones (3.2 days versus 2.2 days) 
(McLoughlin, 2014). Private psychiatric units and hospitals have longer lengths of stay than general hospital psychiatric 
units (McLoughlin, 2013). This is also the perception of the interviewees, who also mentioned the need to make 
comparisons according to specialty (in some of them the average length of stay would be more or less the same). 
Italy: In 2011, the average length of acute hospital stays was 7.2 days in public hospitals and 5.6 days in private ones. The 
average length of non-acute29 hospital stays was 27.8 days in public hospitals and 26.5 days in private ones (Aiop and 
Ermeneia, 2014).
UK: A study by Siciliani et al (2013) found that the overall length of stay in ISTCs and other private centres was shorter (by 
18% and 40% respectively) than in NHS hospitals, even after controlling for differences in the health status of patients. 
This would indicate that such differences can be attributed to efficiency as opposed to the selection of less complex 
patients.
Issues linked to efficiency
Types of services provided
Since most private hospitals (particularly those of small 
or medium size) tend to specialise in a limited number of 
procedures, this allows them to standardise care pathways 
according to best practice. This helps to achieve higher 
technical efficiency than bigger hospitals (usually public 
ones) that provide more types of treatments. Even though 
private hospitals have started to treat more complex 
cases, the complexity of most procedures tends to be 
lower than in public hospitals, which accounts (to a great 
extent) for the differences in length of stay. Focusing on 
elective surgery such as hip replacement, orthopaedic 
care and radiology also means that there is a lower risk 
of complications and that treatment can be scheduled. 
Furthermore, public hospitals provide medical education 
and research services, which is not the case in private 
hospitals; the PPP hospital in Italy is one of the few private 
university hospitals in the EU.
By not treating the more complex and less profitable 
cases, gains in efficiency are achieved at the expense 
of accessibility for patients with complications. While it 
can be expected that private hospitals may not provide 
some types of services, this may entail a referral to public 
hospitals. For example, the Privatklinik Graz Ragnitz in 
Austria does not offer some services (such as computerised 
axial tomography scanning) at the weekend. Patients who 
need this service at the weekend are referred to a public 
hospital.
Role of managers
The importance of management in running a hospital 
efficiently was highlighted by several interviewees. The 
role, their experience and the duties of managers can differ 
in public and private hospitals. In Romania, for example, 
public hospitals are usually managed by doctors who also 
see patients, whereas in private hospitals managers carry 
out their duties full-time and have previous managerial 
experience, although not necessarily in a healthcare 
setting. Even though managers of public hospitals in 
Romania felt that this role should be carried out by staff 
with previous experience in management, interviewees 
in other countries identified some of the challenges 
associated with having managers without training in 
medicine. Staff transferred from the NHS to the ISTCs in 
the UK reported that managers were disengaged from 
clinicians, often making comparisons with productivity 
initiatives in other sectors, rarely participating in team 
meetings and offering little support (Waring and Bishop, 
2011, 2012). Having managers with a background in other 
sectors has led to the adoption of new management 
practices which, in some cases, have been transferred 
to the public sector. In private hospitals in Germany, the 
equipment is chosen by management, whereas in public 
university hospitals it tends to be chosen by staff (German 
case study).
Hospitals and policymakers
Interviewees in Germany felt that political influence led 
to decisions in public hospitals that did not necessarily 
have efficiency as an intended goal and that this political 
29 Includes residual mental health facilities, spinal care units, functional recovery and rehabilitation, long-stay care patients and neurological rehabilitation.
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influence should be minimised if municipal hospitals are 
to perform at the same level as private hospitals (Tissen, 
2005). This resonated with the CEO of a private for-profit 
hospital in Ireland, who stated that public hospitals are 
political entities and that, in case of poor performance, 
they are less likely to be closed as they are often the main 
employer in their area and their closure would also have 
political repercussions.
Profitability, reimbursement mechanisms  
and incentives
Interviewees had different views regarding the influence 
of seeking profitability on the length of stay. Overall, 
the marketisation of hospital services has led to an 
identification of efficiency with profitability (Papouschek, 
2011). While one of the ‘think tanks’ in Germany thought 
that cost efficiency had a negative impact on the length 
of stay of patients; one of the CEOs interviewed in a for-
profit hospital explained that cutting stays short can 
have a negative impact on the reputation of a hospital 
and its staff. Moreover, hospitals do not get reimbursed 
for readmissions. However, the Privatklinik Graz in 
Austria does not accept patients who may need more 
than two days of intensive care, as this is the maximum 
length of stay that will be reimbursed by private health 
insurance. Public hospitals do not have this upper limit of 
reimbursement for intensive care. In Austria, not all private 
for-profit hospitals receive all the costs funded by the 
public sector, which gives a greater incentive to be efficient 
and achieve savings (Czypionka et al, 2012).
As stated in Chapter 4, the type of reimbursement 
mechanism has a major influence on the efficiency of 
hospitals, regardless of their ownership. In Germany, the 
introduction of the DRG system in 2004 in all types of 
hospitals led to a decrease and convergence in the length 
of stay (Augurzky et al, 2015). It also provides incentives 
that cause inefficiencies in the healthcare system as 
a whole, since everyone wants to treat more patients, which 
could cause overcapacity and over hospitalisation. It also 
provides an incentive to provide the most profitable type 
of treatment among all the possible options. The CEO of 
another private hospital in Germany noted that, while DRGs 
gave an incentive to reduce stays in hospitals; this is in line 
with the patient’s interest because patients do not want to 
stay in the hospital for an inappropriately long time.
However, patients can have different attitudes towards the 
length of their stay or their treatment according to the type 
of hospital and personal incentives. In Romania, private 
health insurance is not widespread, constituting only 
0.7% of private spending on health. Therefore, the out-of-
pocket payments incurred for staying in a private hospital 
deters patients from wanting to stay longer. A service 
director in a non-profit hospital in Ireland, where 47% of 
the population has supplementary health insurance, the 
third highest population coverage in Europe (Sagan and 
Thomson, 2016), had experienced the opposite situation, 
with some patients whose treatment is covered by their 
insurance prolonging their stay in order to make the most 
of their entitlement.
Staff
Interviewees in Germany pointed out that private hospitals 
are more cost efficient, partly because they have cut 
personnel costs. Furthermore, the CEO of one hospital 
pointed out that the private sector seems to invest more 
in healthcare staff, while public hospitals seem to have 
a relatively large administrative department. Operating 
teams in ISTCs have more repeat exposure, which leads to 
greater efficiency.
Being part of a group or chain
Savings and gains in efficiency have been the rationale 
for the merger in Austria of small (public and private) 
hospitals in hospital groups or chains (Papouschek, 2011). 
Being a member of a private group that owns several 
hospitals gives an advantage in terms of economies of 
scale, coordinating care and being able to spread loans 
over the entire organisation (Schulten, 2006). It also 
enables greater bargaining power when purchasing large 
quantities of equipment, so that operating costs can 
be reduced. Furthermore, there are fewer restrictions 
regarding tendering procedures. For example, the PPP in 
Austria contracted out the building of a new hospital wing 
and was able to choose the offer that best represented 
value for money, rather than the cheapest one. Public 
hospitals are also grouped together in other countries, but 
in Ireland for example, the hospital groups established in 
2015 do not purchase care themselves.
Physical facilities
Private hospitals in Germany benefit from having an 
infrastructure that enables them to work more efficiently; 
for instance, having all the departments under one 
roof instead of different buildings scattered around 
different places. Having admission and recovery areas 
close to theatre has been identified as a best practice 
that improved productivity in ISTCs in the UK (House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2006).
Work organisation and processes
Overall, managers in private hospitals have more room 
for manoeuvre to hire and fire staff, and to restructure 
and streamline processes. Private hospitals in Italy have 
managed to increase the case-mix and the average 
weight30 of patients (in the context of decreased funding) 
to a greater extent than their public counterparts. This 
suggests that they may be more flexible in adapting to 
changes. At the Privatklinik Graz Ragnitz, interviewees 
felt that decisions to address changes can be made 
more quickly than in public hospitals, as there are less 
bureaucratic processes that need to be adhered to before 
a decision can be taken.
An interviewee from the Krankenhaus Oberndorf in Austria 
stated that it was able to achieve high technical efficiency 
when a hospital extension and its private rehabilitation 
facility were brought into full service, as this led to 
an optimal use of synergies between the surgical and 
rehabilitation treatment of orthopaedic patients.
30 Average weight is an indicator of complexity of illness/cases treated, assigning relative weights to each group of patients according to their discharge numbers.
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Interviewees in private hospitals in Ireland and the UK 
have stated that having more efficient patient pathways 
(in which outliers can be identified) is behind their 
efficiency results. In the UK, it was reported that private 
organisations have innovated more in organisational and 
working practices (process innovation), while the NHS has 
greater resources to drive innovation in clinical practice 
(that is, product innovation). One of the effective work 
processes identified by the Department of Health in ISTCs 
includes minimising bed transfers and the time spent by 
patients on the operating table, for example through local 
rather than general anaesthesia. Speeding up recovery to 
reduce bed time, increasing the facility’s productivity and 
enhancing the patient experience, was achieved by the use 
of chair-based post-operative recovery and a discharge 
lounge. The Department of Health (2006) also pointed 
out that many of these changes were also piloted and 
implemented in NHS settings at the time and, as such, 
were not exclusive to the private sector.
Administration processes can also have an impact on 
efficiency. The private hospitals in Italy had put in place 
measures such as a reduction of administrative processes 
to minimise the patient transfer time to the rehabilitation 
ward, so that rehabilitation could start immediately after 
surgery and the length of stay can stay below the DRG 
threshold. Performing all analyses and checks before 
surgery had also enabled the length of stay to be reduced.
Maximising the usage of operating theatres also leads 
to greater efficiency. In ISTCs in the UK, theatres are 
open 12 hours a day, 6 days a week. In Irish private 
hospitals, theatres have longer opening hours than in 
public hospitals. Differences in the continuity of care also 
have an impact on efficiency. Interviewees in public and 
private hospitals in Romania pointed out that for-profit 
hospitals are better equipped for pre- and post-treatment 
procedures.
Differences between public and private hospitals in 
relation to discharge also have an impact on the length of 
stay. Unlike in public hospitals, ‘bed blocking’ due to lack 
of home care or a place in a nursing home is not an issue in 
Irish private hospitals, since patients are asked to organise 
their convalescence before they start their treatment. On 
the other hand, it may be that private hospitals tend to 
be less well connected to the wider network of healthcare 
providers.
Monitoring by third parties
The incentives to extend the stay of patients or to 
provide treatments that are more costly or have higher 
reimbursement rates are minimised by the checks and 
balances exerted by third parties. In Ireland, private 
hospitals negotiate an average length of stay with each 
health insurer and insurers can query why patients stay 
longer than the average. This reduces the likelihood of 
hospitals prolonging the stay of patients in order to get 
a larger reimbursement, as there is a risk of a financial 
penalty – or of not being reimbursed at all. However, 
negotiations with private insurers can have a negative 
impact on efficiency as they require time and resources.
With regard to the practice of upcoding, the 
appropriateness of DRG allocation (based on the patient’s 
records) is checked in audits carried out by the regional 
authorities in Austria and Italy. Krankenhaus Oberndorf 
stated that the regional health authority which funds them 
tests a random sample of 1.5% of cases for correct coding 
in the hospitals it finances each year. For 2013 and 2014, 
the results showed similar or better results compared with 
the other fund hospitals in the region, indicating that most 
cases were coded correctly. In cases where the coding was 
incorrect, the reimbursement of incorrect codes did not 
lead to higher compensation. In the UK, clinical coding has 
been in place since 2007.
Accessibility
Types of services provided to patients
The differences in service provision outlined in the 
previous section are also relevant for accessibility. While 
the reimbursement system affects the choice of services in 
all types of hospitals and the provision of certain services 
may be a strategic choice rather than just seeking profits 
(for example, the PPP hospital in Austria), the search for 
profitability in private hospitals leads to differences in 
the choice of services offered. Services that are profitable 
and that can be standardised are favoured over others. 
In Germany, for example, private for-profit hospitals 
have approximately 16% of the total number of hospital 
patients, but they provide treatment for 46.4% of varicose 
diseases (Böhm, 2015).
The privatisation of small hospitals in rural areas of 
Germany has led to the closure of a number of emergency 
departments and other labour-intensive departments, 
such as paediatric wards. This can also be seen in other 
countries where few private hospitals have accident and 
emergency departments. These differences in the types 
of services provided in public and private hospitals have 
an impact on waiting times: those hospitals that do not 
have accident and emergency departments do not have 
as many unscheduled patients as those that have this 
department.
Concerns about the exclusion of patients who require 
more complex interventions or less profitable treatments 
were raised in several countries. Focusing on treatments 
that are more profitable and are more appealing 
for patients with voluntary health insurance, can be 
considered as a way of selecting patients with fewer 
health problems or providing higher reimbursements 
for treatments. In Austria, private non-profit hospitals 
receiving public funding have a legal duty to treat every 
patient who seeks admission. In practice, these hospitals 
tend to provide less outpatient treatments and are less 
likely to have accident and emergency departments than 
public hospitals. As there are no non-profit university 
hospitals, and only a few of them are tertiary hospitals, 
patients with complex conditions are not referred to them. 
In Ireland, the Health Service Executive contracted out 
inpatient services in 2015. People with chronic illnesses 
(such as diabetes and rheumatism) were initially accepted 
by the private sector, but it was then found that private 
hospitals could not meet their needs adequately.
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This also has an effect on public hospitals. In the UK, 
ISTCs were set up specifically to treat low-risk, elective 
patients rather than high-risk, high-cost patients. Each 
ISTC had its own list of exclusion criteria, which typically 
included demographic factors such as age, social factors 
(for example, availability of a carer at discharge), and 
clinical factors (such as health status) (Mason et al, 2008). 
Since ISTCs accept only ‘healthier’ patients for treatment, 
with less severe conditions (Chard et al, 2011), this leaves 
the more complex cases to the NHS. For the top 30 Health 
Resource Groups, patients treated by the NHS were 
significantly less healthy, underwent more procedures and 
were more likely to come from deprived areas compared 
with patients treated by private providers. Public hospitals 
exposed to the nearby entry of ISTCs were found to 
experience nearly 50% deterioration in average patient 
health status (Cooper et al, 2014). Other studies, however, 
have pointed out that the difference in the severity of 
symptoms before surgery was small; concluding that 
there was little evidence that ISTCs ‘cherry-pick’ healthier 
parents (Chard et al, 2011).
Waiting times and lists
As stated in Chapter 3, waiting lists in public hospitals 
are one of the drivers for private provision. Private 
hospitals can take additional work from public hospitals 
that struggle to meet waiting time targets. The ISTC in 
Nottingham, UK, for example, was able to do so by holding 
additional clinic sessions at weekends.
In many cases, the public sector has commissioned 
services from private hospitals for which there is a long 
waiting list in public hospitals. This can help to reduce 
waiting lists but, in some cases, at considerable cost for 
the public sector. Furthermore, the geographical mismatch 
between needs and space capacity, the reluctance of 
doctors to refer, and patients to be referred to private 
providers, can lead to a lack of use of capacity. This has 
been the case of ISTCs in the UK, whose capacity was 
not used at a time when the 18-week limit was breached 
at NHS hospitals (Financial Times, 2016). In the UK, it is 
unclear whether the introduction of ISTCs has helped to 
decrease waiting lists or not, as the number of procedures 
they perform constitutes a small fraction of the total 
and during their introduction, NHS funding focused 
on reducing waiting lists (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2006; Bartlett et al, 2011).
An important issue in Austria and Ireland (in relation to 
waiting lists) is the situation of privately insured patients in 
public hospitals, with both countries having a high take-up 
of supplementary health insurance.
In Austria, patients who have supplementary private 
health insurance can choose to be treated in fund (public) 
hospitals. It used to be the case that patients with private 
insurance would be put on waiting lists ahead of patients 
with only statutory health insurance, although this was 
prohibited by law. A change in legislation in 2012 was 
supposed to make waiting lists more transparent, but 
failed to do so.
In Ireland, patients who can pay privately have a shorter 
wait to receive treatment than public patients. One study 
also pointed out that private inpatients used more bed 
days that were available to them more often (14.1%) than 
public ones (12.6%) (O’Reilly and Wiley, 2010). Since 2014, 
there has been a move towards full economic costing of 
private activity in public hospitals, which can charge the 
full price of a hospital bed. This measure was criticised by 
the Private Hospital Association, as this could result in an 
increase in private insurance premiums and, therefore, 
fewer clients for private hospitals (thejournal.ie, 2013).
Cost as a barrier
With the exception of Germany,31 in all the countries 
included in the case studies, treatments are more 
expensive in private hospitals that are not publicly 
financed than in public hospitals, or private hospitals 
financed publicly. When comparing costs, it is important 
to take into account that, in some countries, informal 
payments may be more widespread in some types of 
hospitals than others.
Low remuneration of staff in the public sector has been 
identified as one of the main risk factors for soliciting or 
accepting informal payments (European Commission, 
2013c). In Romania, widespread informal payments reduce 
the access to healthcare for people with low incomes 
(European Commission, 2016b). It is estimated that 
nearly half of the population in Romania makes informal 
payments for hospital admission (ASSPRO CEE 2007, 
2013). One of the private hospitals in Romania employs 
its staff full-time so that they cannot refer patients to their 
practice in a public hospital, where informal payments are 
more common.
Some private hospitals offer price discounts for care 
packages and exemptions for those patients who cannot 
afford treatments. This was the case in the private 
hospitals included in the Irish and Romanian case studies, 
which cooperated with credit unions and organised charity 
activities offering treatments for free. One of the hospitals 
in Ireland has a clinical finance group linking clinical and 
financial operations, assessing the referrals of patients 
that cannot afford their services. One of the interviewees 
at a Romanian hospital stated that as long as the amounts 
reimbursed by the public sector do not cover the real 
costs of performing surgery, they are not in a position to 
broaden access by lowering fees.
Physical accessibility
Disparities in the geographical spread of public and private 
hospitals have been reported in several countries. In 
Germany, private hospitals are less present in the eastern 
part of the country. Private hospitals are more present in 
urban areas of Romania than in rural areas, where they 
are more accessible because they are closer to the main 
roads than public hospitals. In contrast, public hospitals in 
Austria (which are usually larger than private ones) tend to 
be located in urban areas.
31 Patients pay the same price in any hospital included in the national hospital plan.
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In England, the growth of private sector providers had 
been inhibited in more deprived areas as the demands of 
the patients were more extensive. For example, the health 
company Circle Health decided to locate a new hospital in 
Bath, because a large proportion of residents were covered 
by private medical insurance and the area scores above 
the England average on nearly all indicators of affluence 
and health, and below average on unemployment rates 
(CMA, 2014).
Policies assuring the coordination of public and private 
hospitals by having one adjacent to the other (for example, 
the co-location policy in Ireland in the past decade) 
deepen these geographical disparities. ISTCs in the UK 
that were established in phase 2 of the programme were 
generally operated over several sites and were frequently 
co-located with existing private hospitals (Naylor and 
Gregory, 2009; Cooper et al, 2014).
Known accessibility
Regarding the direct access to facilities, all hospitals 
in Italy must make available online the Public Services 
Charter (Carta dei Servizi). This gives relevant information 
on:
 how to access the facility;
 the opening time of offices and ambulatory facilities;
 how to access hospitalisation services;
 reservation procedures.
Hospitals are increasingly offering web services to 
make contact and access to healthcare services easier. 
Investment in web services also aims to give better-quality 
services to citizens and to improve the sharing of health 
and clinical data (for example, the provision of electronic 
health records by the NHS). One common type of 
information found on the website of healthcare providers 
is procedural waiting times, which informs citizens in 
choosing appropriate hospitals for their treatments.
Issues linked to accessibility
Follow-up/continuity of care
Public and private hospitals face different challenges 
when it comes to ensuring continuity and follow-up in 
the care they provide. Access to beds in public hospitals 
can be delayed by patients who cannot be discharged 
because they do not have a place in a nursing home or 
cannot avail themselves of home care services. Although 
delayed discharges can lead to the cancellation of many 
procedures in public hospitals, this is not an issue in 
private hospitals because patients are asked to arrange 
their convalescence prior to admission. Some private 
hospitals have developed their own community clinics 
but, overall, private hospitals are not as well connected to 
other healthcare services (like community care) as their 
public counterparts. In Ireland, patients who develop 
complications after care in a private hospital often need to 
go back to their general practioner (GP) to get a referral, 
which leads to affordability issues (interview with 
academic expert in Ireland).
Staff shortages
Shortages of staff in certain specialities contribute towards 
long waiting times in Irish public hospitals. For example, 
having lower pay levels than in other English speaking 
countries deters theatre nurses from working in Ireland, 
which makes recruitment difficult. Private hospitals face 
similar shortage challenges, but their remuneration is not 
constrained by civil service pay levels. Overall, there is 
a mismatch between the budget available and the existing 
human resources (interview with head of public sector 
department).
Private for-profit hospitals in Austria and Romania 
generally have fewer specialised medical staff available 
on a permanent basis than public hospitals. For this 
reason, high-risk patients are often referred to hospitals 
funded by the public sector. These hospitals have 
a better infrastructure to handle any complications and 
emergencies that may arise.
Quality and monitoring
Obtaining data about any dimension of quality from 
private hospitals proved to be difficult in all the countries 
included in the case studies, as they may consider such 
data to be commercially sensitive and provide it only 
about the areas of quality where they excel. Problems with 
care may only be made public if they are uncovered by the 
media or if patients are referred to public hospitals.
Furthermore, data gathered through user satisfaction 
surveys tend to focus on non-medical aspects (such as 
food and accommodation) and provide inconclusive 
findings regarding the importance of hospital ownership, 
with replies being influenced by the gender and age of the 
respondent rather than by the type of hospital.
Comparing quality outcomes from public and private 
hospitals is also difficult given the differences in 
treatments and patients and the fact that, in some cases, 
patients with complications are transferred from private to 
public hospitals.32
The lack of data makes it difficult or impossible to evaluate 
the outcomes of care contracted out or initiatives like 
the ISTC programme. A recent report concluded that the 
lack of transparency and comparable data prevented an 
assessment of the level of safety in private hospitals in the 
UK (Leys and Toft, 2014). However, the need for better data 
is being addressed – to some degree. In 2014, the Private 
Healthcare Information Network (PHIN), an independent 
non-profit organisation, was given a legal mandate to 
collect and make available data from all private healthcare 
facilities and on all patients (private and NHS-funded). 
The data will be benchmarked against NHS data wherever 
possible and will enable publication of performance 
measures by procedure at both hospital and consultant 
level. Hospitals were required to start collecting data from 
January 2016, which PHIN will start to make public via its 
website from April 2017.
Outcomes
32 These transfers delay the provision of care and therefore have a negative effect on health outcomes.
43
Evidence from the country case studies
In Germany, information from patient surveys shows 
a decline over the years in satisfaction with private services 
and an increase (particularly strong in private clinics) of 
the number of patients who feel they were discharged 
too early. Satisfaction with how patients are treated is 
also lower in private hospitals than in public hospitals 
(Schulten and Böhlke, 2009).
In Ireland, patient experience surveys show that patients 
have, overall, found the care purchased in private hospitals 
satisfactory. The information available in the UK shows 
that ISTCs have had similar outcomes to the NHS, with 
some ISTCs reaching top scores in their respective areas 
of specialisation (for example, hip replacement) (NHS 
Partners Network, 2013).
The UK is, by far, the country included in the case studies 
where most studies were found to be looking at differences 
between public and private hospitals in terms of quality 
outcomes. Several studies have shown that health 
outcomes for patients treated in ISTCs is equal to, or 
slightly better than for patients treated in NHS hospitals. 
A study comparing patients treated in six ISTCs with 
patients treated by 20 NHS providers during 2006–2007 
found that patients reported similar health improvements 
following hernia repair, varicose vein surgery and knee 
replacement surgery (Browne et al, 2008). Improvements 
after cataract surgery and hip replacement were slightly 
greater for patients treated in ISTCs; patients also reported 
slightly greater health gains for hip operations conducted 
in private facilities (Appleby, 2015). A survey of patients 
from 21 NHS providers and 9 ISTCs (2008–2009) showed 
that patients undergoing hip and knee replacements 
in ISTCs had better outcomes in terms of severity of 
symptoms, health-related quality of life and post-operative 
complications (Chard et al, 2011). However, overall, these 
differences were small and their clinical relevance minor. 
The authors noted that they could be attributable to 
differences in patient characteristics that were not fully 
taken into account.
Issues linked to quality
Staff
Despite the lack of data, one could expect to see 
differences in process quality due to the differences in the 
staff employed in public and private hospitals.
In Austrian private for-profit hospitals, the ratio of nurses 
to beds tended to be equal to or better than that of public 
and private non-profit hospitals, with 1 out of 8 private for-
profit hospitals with a ratio of 1 paediatric nurse for more 
than 20 beds during the night, compared with 10 out of 17 
public hospitals. For physicians, the opposite is the case. 
This is because all public and private non-profit hospitals 
had at least one gynaecologist and one anaesthesiologist 
on duty, whereas in several private for-profit hospitals 
these specialised physicians were only available on 
call. This is due to the setup of private hospitals (as 
noted above) which provide the infrastructure where 
independent physicians can book to treat their own 
patients (Konsument, 2005).
In Germany, interviewees noted that public hospitals 
tended to employ more clerical staff than private ones, 
which had proportionately more healthcare staff. Overall, 
however, private hospitals tended to have fewer doctors 
per hospital bed than public hospitals (and more nurses 
per hospital bed). Data show that the number of cases 
for all types of employees is higher in for-profit hospitals, 
followed by not-for-profit and then public (Augurzky et 
al, 2015). In Ireland, it has also been reported that non-
specialist doctors in public hospitals tend to have less 
experience than their counterparts in private hospitals. 
This has been linked to several of the complaints 
received in public hospitals about the quality of care. 
The opposite situation can be found in the UK, where 
post-operative care is provided by a team of specialists 
in the NHS, whereas in private hospitals, on-site medical 
care (including post-operative care) is often provided by 
a single agency-provided resident medical officer (RMO) 
(Leys and Toft, 2015, p. 7). These tend to be junior doctors 
with only a few years’ experience and are responsible for 
as many as 30–40 overnight patients. Due to the lack of 
data, however, it is difficult to determine if this staffing 
practice has a negative effect on safety. The regulatory 
body in England (the Care Quality Commission) has not 
raised concerns about staffing levels in private hospitals. 
As one interviewee put it: ‘It’s all fine [in a private hospital] 
as long as everything goes exactly to plan’.
Equipment and physical facilities
The newer the hospital infrastructure is, the lower the risk 
of infections. In Ireland and Romania, interviewees noted 
that private hospitals tend to have more modern facilities; 
most public hospital buildings in Romania date from 
before the 1990s. In addition, public hospitals carry out 
relatively few general disinfection procedures, repainting 
and refurbishment. Furthermore, public hospitals have 
to follow public purchasing rules, which usually impose 
the ‘lowest price rule’ as the selection criterion. In private 
hospitals, medical devices (including the disinfectants 
used in operating rooms and within the entire hospital) 
can be selected on the basis of cost–benefit analyses and 
on a longer term perspective.
Quality monitoring mechanisms
A survey looking at the application of quality improvement 
strategies in 389 public and private hospitals in 8 countries 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain and the UK) found that external assessment 
was the most widespread (88%) quality improvement 
strategy among the hospitals surveyed (Lombarts et 
al, 2009). This external assessment can take the form 
of accreditation, certification, licensing or inspection. 
Inspection was the most widespread form of external 
assessment, with 66% of the hospitals participating in the 
survey having been subject to one.
In terms of how this external assessment takes place, an 
EU wide study found that 19 countries had accreditation, 
certification and/or licensing systems in place or under 
discussion, with voluntary rather than compulsory 
frameworks appearing to be the norm (de Walcque et al, 
2008). However, this external assessment may be applied 
to public and private hospitals differently. In England, the 
Care Quality Commission (the independent regulator of 
health and adult social care) initiated a new inspection 
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regime for private hospitals in November 2014. Historically, 
independent healthcare was not formally subject to 
either national or local government health policy to the 
same extent as the NHS; for example, participation in 
national audits was voluntary rather than mandatory. 
In October 2014, new regulations on quality and safety 
were introduced,33 whereby all providers are expected to 
register with the Care Quality Commission. This includes 
inspections of private hospitals by teams of inspectors 
with a much greater range of expertise than before, and 
gathering equivalent information about performance to 
that received from NHS hospitals.
In Italy, accreditation divides private hospitals in two 
categories: Private hospitals that can provide performance 
equivalent to public hospitals recognised as ‘accredited 
hospitals’ that receive a fee for their services directly from 
the regions and the national health service, and non-
accredited private hospitals that are only authorised to 
carry out certain healthcare activities, paid for directly by 
citizens.
In those countries without accreditation systems for 
private hospitals (Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland and Portugal), 
certification can be obtained from other bodies. In Austria, 
for example, the quality of services in private hospitals can 
be certified annually by an external State-approved and 
independent institute, which provides a certificate geared 
towards health tourism. In Ireland, to become members 
of the Private Hospitals Association, hospitals need to be 
accredited by an internationally recognised accreditation 
body such as the Joint Commission International. In both 
these countries, some private hospitals have voluntarily 
applied standards initially devised only for public 
hospitals (for example, the HIQA Standards for Safer 
Better Healthcare in Ireland).
Another way to monitor performance is by getting the 
views of patients which, according to the MARQuIS study,34 
is usually done through the analysis of patient complaints 
(85.7% of hospitals consulted) or by monitoring their 
views or by carrying outpatient surveys. The complaints 
procedure can differ greatly depending on the type of 
hospital ownership. In Ireland, for example, patients in 
public hospitals can raise complaints to the Ombudsman 
and the Health Service Executive, but these options are not 
available to patients in private hospitals.35
In Romania, private hospitals have reporting systems 
used for tracking operational and financial data, as well as 
overall employee and patient satisfaction; public hospitals 
are only just starting to use such systems for tracking 
purposes. The availability of these systems makes it easier 
to identify areas needing improvement, which private 
hospitals then target to increase efficiency. Since 2015, 
there has been a legal requirement for all public hospitals 
to implement patient feedback (including whether they 
were asked for informal payments) mechanisms, which 
should be monitored by hospitals on a regular basis to 
allow an evaluation of the quality of medical services. 
Moreover, a website launched in late 2015 allows patients 
to rate the care received in public or private hospitals.
At the individual hospital level, the Nottingham NHS 
Treatment Centre analysed feedback and monitored 
themes to change practice accordingly, along with 
a quarterly quality scorecard to aid in this process. Patients 
were called 28 days after surgery to monitor clinical 
outcome data that included surgical site infections, while 
an online incident reporting system enabled staff to report 
all actual incidents and near misses where patient safety 
may have been compromised.
Table 8 describes the quality improvement and monitoring 
mechanisms used in the country case studies.
Cross-cutting issues
Competition
33 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014.
34 Multi-Centre Medication Reconciliation Quality Improvement Study.
35 It was felt by one of the interviewees in the for-profit hospital that there is currently too much focus by the public sector on encouraging patients to complain 
and that this can undermine the trust issue that doctors and patients must have, sending out a wrong image. The previous government had plans to establish 
a National Patient Safety Office and a patient advocacy service to provide advice and to detect patient safety trends in healthcare (Department of Health, 2015).
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Interviewees from the public sector in Germany felt that 
competition between public and private hospitals enables 
both to learn and improve their performance. This was 
also the case in public hospitals in England, which have 
replicated efficiency measures implemented in ISTCs 
(Bartlett et al, 2011). A study showed that after an ISTC 
opened in the area, the time from admission – to hospital – 
to start of surgery at a local NHS hospital was shown to 
improve by nearly 70%, which in turn translated into a 24% 
increase in the percentage of patients treated on the day 
of admission (Cooper et al, 2014). It has also been reported 
that the threat of competition from ISTCs was used by 
managers of some NHS trusts to drive change (Turner et 
al, 2011). However, the overall impact of competition on 
efficiency and cost in the NHS is unclear, as summarised 
in a recent review (BMA, 2014). While some studies found 
that competition was potentially useful to stimulate better 
quality in terms of management practices, other effects 
were detrimental such as greater costs due to the need 
to establish and manage competition between multiple 
providers, and monitoring providers. It is worth noting that 
the ISTC programme also had a significant effect on private 
healthcare sector fees which, as a result, fell by as much 
as 50% for some operations (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2006).
While competition can increase productivity in the 
short term, the dynamics of markets can also lead to 
concentration in large clinical groups, with the subsequent 
decrease in productivity (André and Hermann, 2009). 
This concentration of private provision has taken place 
in Italy, where public funding of private hospitals has 
decreased since the beginning of the financial crisis. This 
had a negative effect on non-profit hospitals and led to 
increased takeover of activities from private providers and 
groups aiming to consolidate their position on the market 
in order to achieve scale.
There are other factors that influence competition 
between public and private hospitals. For example, in 
Ireland, public hospitals receive a fixed daily payment 
(equivalent to approximately half of the actual treatment 
cost) for every private patient in a private bed. This subsidy 
for private care in public hospitals places private hospitals 
at a competitive disadvantage (O’Reilly and Wiley, 2010). 
It also gives an incentive to private insurance providers to 
have patients treated in public hospitals, where the costs 
are lower.
Table 8. Quality monitoring and improvement mechanisms in the country case studies
Austria Quality measurement and improvement in Austria is based on the use of the Austrian Inpatient Quality Indicators (A-IQI) 
system. This system, first introduced in 2011, collects data for hospitals financed by health funds in Austria, and some 
private-for-profit hospitals (such as the one included in this case study). The indicators contained within the A-IQI are 
based on documentation relating to diagnoses and services. Hospitals ‘underperforming’, in comparison to benchmark 
figures, must submit explanations of the reasons for this. The results are published for the whole of Austria, as well as 
disaggregated by regions. Information about individual hospitals is available internally but not published.
Germany Since 1996, regulation requires hospitals to publish an annual quality report and to establish a certified internal quality 
management system. The Institute for Quality and Transparency in HealthCare (IQTIG) was established in 2015 and 
since 2016 is responsible for the development of quality indicators that are comparable across hospitals. It publishes 
a yearly report for all hospitals and liaises with those hospitals that have quality outcomes below the average. It is 
expected that this information will allow patients to compare and select hospitals.
Ireland There are plans to extend the remit of the Irish Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) to inspect and, in the 
long term, to license all types of hospitals (Irish Times, 2015). In the case of mental health hospitals (both public and 
private), inspections are carried out by the Mental Health Commission, set up in 2002. Their inspections cover several 
areas of care and service provision.
Italy In Italy, the Ministry of Health is responsible for continuously monitoring the outcomes at individual hospitals and has 
recently implemented a National Outcomes Program. The Centro Ortopedico di Quadrante uses a balanced scorecard 
system.
Romania The National Authority for Quality Management in Healthcare evaluates all types of hospitals. In addition, all public 
hospitals in Romania have been mandated to implement a patient feedback mechanism. While hospitals must 
internally monitor and report on feedback, there is no centralised database of results. In private hospitals the process is 
to request written feedback from patients upon discharge, but this is only analysed internally.
There are plans to accredit all hospitals (public and private) into four categories by 2020: Accredited; high confidence; 
low confidence, and not accredited. All hospitals not accredited by 2020 will be closed. This includes an evaluation of 
all private hospitals by the National Authority for Quality Management in Healthcare (ANMCS) on a range of dimensions 
including strategic and operational management, human resources management, environmental management, quality 
management services, patient rights and communication, patient data management, health care management, and 
prevention and risk management.
UK Quality improvement mechanisms in the UK are based around the Care Quality Commission’s (CQC), the independent 
regulator for health and social care services, inspection regime. The CQC inspects and rates both publicly-funded and 
private hospitals. In addition to the CQC regime, hospitals should have their own quality improvement mechanisms to 
ensure that the quality of services is monitored on an ongoing basis, and necessary improvements implemented (such 
as clinical outcomes data).
Source: Case studies and Bublitz (2016)
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Transfers of patients to public hospitals
Transfers of patients in private hospitals tend to 
happen when complications arise. Even though private 
hospitals are starting to treat more complex cases (and 
some of them have their own accident and emergency 
departments), the expansion of private provision is done 
on the basis of making use of the accident and emergency 
departments in public hospitals as a safety net that 
reduces risks and costs. Patients are also transferred when 
the care received at private hospitals does not suit their 
needs or when affordability issues arise. The latter has 
been experienced in private hospitals in Romania, where 
patients often cannot afford unscheduled treatments or 
prolonged stays, and therefore they are transferred to 
public hospitals so that they do not incur further debt.
As a consequence of these transfers, public hospitals have 
to deal with unscheduled complex cases and patients 
may feel that their condition worsens due to the delay in 
receiving care. The problems associated with unscheduled 
complex cases have been reduced (in some cases) by 
having agreements between public and private hospitals.
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6 Conclusions
This chapter summarises the main lessons learnt from the 
overview, the case studies and the literature review and 
presents the policy pointers based on these lessons.
The data available from Eurostat and OECD show an 
increase in private for-profit provision of hospital services 
over the past decade. This increase took place within 
a context of closure, privatisation and a reduction in the 
capacity of public and non-profit private provision. This 
does not necessarily mean, however, that private for-profit 
hospitals are taking over the role of public hospitals. There 
seems to be a trend towards having more and smaller 
private hospitals owned – not only by doctors – but also by 
long-term investors.
On the basis of the information available, it seems that 
private providers complement the services provided by 
the public sector rather than replace them, particularly in 
areas such as diagnostics and elective surgery. In several 
Member States, private provision has expanded while 
using public hospitals (particularly their accident and 
emergency departments) as a safety net when complex 
issues arise. Focusing more on technology and being 
connected with other healthcare providers will be critical 
in the future, as the ageing of population increases the 
possibility of multimorbidity (the presence of two or more 
chronic medical conditions in an individual). It is not yet 
clear whether the relationship between the public and 
private sectors will be marked by increased competition or 
cooperation.
Over the past few years, there has also been an increase in 
private investment in hospital services. In many countries, 
private provision has been used to reduce waiting times 
at public hospitals and to contain costs in public budgets. 
But even though PPPs can be advantageous as they do not 
require upfront capital expenditure, countries like Austria, 
France and Portugal have experienced cases of delays 
and exceeded budgets. Comparing the costs incurred by 
contracting out hospital services or providing them in 
public hospitals can be challenging due to the differences 
in the budgets allocated.
In addition to ongoing reforms, it is very likely that the 
role of the generalist doctor and specialised nurse will 
become more prominent given their increased capacity to 
provide diagnostic services. Furthermore, it is foreseeable 
that patients will also be better informed, be able to self-
assess their health better through wearable devices and 
have more virtual contact with care providers. This has 
implications for the length of stay in hospitals; if self-
health is done correctly, the length of stay will decrease. 
Technological developments may also increase the 
complexity of the treatments offered by private hospitals.
The evidence on the impact of private provision on the 
efficiency, accessibility and quality of services provides 
different results depending on the context, with factors 
outside of hospitals having more influence on service 
delivery than whether they are public or private. This 
influence of external factors makes it difficult to draw 
general conclusions. Moreover, disentangling the 
outcomes due to the type of ownership from other 
confounding factors is a challenge.
The type of payment system used influences all aspects 
of service delivery. Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) 
have an impact on service delivery because they have 
the potential to be used as a tool to improve efficiency 
and to treat as many patients as possible. However, 
DRGs have been criticised in France by the employer 
organisation representing public hospitals for not taking 
into account the more complex nature of the interventions 
and services provided in the public sector. DRGs can also 
have a negative impact on efficiency since they increase 
the administrative work in hospitals. The use of DRGs also 
gives incentives for upcoding (André and Hermann, 2009; 
Jürges and Köberlein, 2013). They also have an impact on 
the quality of the services delivered, which can be positive 
(for example, better coordination between care providers 
to reduce costs) or negative, given that they provide 
an incentive to reduce the cost per stay (irrespective of 
outcomes) or to overprovide certain services (Or and 
Häkkinen, 2011).
Efficiency
The studies found in the literature review highlight the 
influence of funding mechanisms on the efficiency of all 
types of hospitals. In the case of DRGs, these take different 
forms across Europe and information about their effects is 
partial and difficult to compare, with no consensus on the 
best way to design them (Geissler et al, 2015). Some of the 
drawbacks of this reimbursement mechanism described in 
the European overview and the case studies include:
 producing overcapacity;
 a focus on volume over quality (Germany);
 a poor link between the prices and actual costs of 
complex treatments (Bulgaria, France, Hungary and 
Romania).
Two studies identified upcoding as an issue in Italian 
private hospitals (before legislation was put in place 
to tackle it). It was also identified as a problem in the 
implementation of DRGs in Bulgaria and seems to be 
an increasing problem in the Netherlands (European 
Commission, 2013c). In the regions where those hospitals 
chosen in the Austrian and Italian case studies are 
situated, upcoding does not seem to be more prevalent in 
private hospitals.
Other factors causing differences in the technical efficiency 
of public and private hospitals highlighted in the case 
studies and the literature review are staffing (including 
salaries) and work processes. Studies focusing on private 
hospitals in Italy show that overstaffing and problems to 
adjust input resources due to regulations have an negative 
impact on the efficiency of private hospitals (Daidone and 
D’Amico, 2009; Matranga and Sapienza, 2015). Differences 
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in salaries (which may be higher in private hospitals) 
have also had an impact on cost efficiency. The German 
case study shows that cutting personnel costs has helped 
private hospitals to be cost efficient.
While one of the main drivers for increased private 
provision in many countries is that the private sector is 
more cost efficient, no conclusive evidence was found in 
this research. Only one study on the topic (Herr, 2008) was 
considered rigorous enough to be included in the literature 
review. The two studies included in the case studies 
(Government of Ireland, 2009; Appleby et al, 2013) are 
based on estimates due to the lack of data and illustrate 
the comparability issues.
Although the length of stay in for-profit hospitals in the 
countries analysed in the case studies was shorter than in 
public hospitals (for some categories of patients), the link 
between hospital ownership and length of stay was less 
clear in the studies selected in the literature review. One 
of the factors influencing the length of stay referred to in 
both the literature review and the case studies is the extent 
to which care is available during the convalescence period 
after the hospital stay. Daily reimbursement mechanisms 
appear to be a strong incentive to extend the stay of 
patients, although interviewees at private hospitals in 
Ireland pointed out that private insurance companies can 
monitor costs.
Accessibility
Surveys in France and Poland showed that public hospitals 
are perceived to ensure equal access to services better 
than private ones. Patients in public hospitals in the 
UK seemed to be more satisfied with the accessibility 
of services than patients in private hospitals (Owusu-
Frimpong et al, 2010). Rejecting patients who require more 
complex treatments and who are therefore less profitable 
is a common criticism of private hospitals. This research 
found evidence of this in two Italian studies (Berta et 
al, 2010; Preti et al, 2010), with other studies reporting 
differences in age, socioeconomic status and insurance 
coverage between patients in public and private hospitals. 
Another study found that private hospitals had more 
patients from outside the catchment area, indicating that 
patients with enough resources could be more mobile 
(Fattore et al, 2014). The case studies showed that not 
offering less profitable types of services (for example, 
accident and emergency departments) was an indirect 
form of ‘cream skimming’, with public hospitals being left 
with patients with more severe conditions.
In addition to a lack of profitability incentives, staff 
shortages can also limit the types of services provided. 
Offering a more attractive workplace and better 
remuneration was mentioned in the Romanian case 
studies as reasons for the ‘brain drain’ that the public 
sector had been experiencing towards the private sector. 
In other countries, such as Ireland, both public and private 
hospitals have experienced shortages in specialised 
staff, and specific posts such as operating theatre nurses. 
Furthermore, the standardisation of care in private 
hospitals can lead to knowledge gaps and the need for 
additional training. Access to job rotation schemes and 
training funds have proved useful in some countries to 
retain staff.
According to Eurofound (2013), areas of concern regarding 
the working conditions of healthcare workers include:
 atypical and irregular working hours;
 job strain (high levels of work intensity coupled with 
low levels of job autonomy);
 significant levels of risk to health because of work 
affecting health negatively.
A study looking at the recruitment and retention strategies 
of the health workforce in Europe (European Commission, 
2015) includes examples how to recruit nurses through:
 extending the practice and development of advanced 
roles;
 providing good working environments through 
professional autonomy and worker participation;
 making the hospital workplace more attractive by 
improving family-friendly practices.
The studies conducted in some of the countries where care 
has been purchased from private hospitals with the aim 
of reducing waiting lists in public hospitals (Ireland, UK), 
suggest that it is not entirely clear whether this strategy 
has effectively led to a reduction or whether it is a more 
cost-effective strategy than investing in the capacity of 
public hospitals. This research has also identified the 
reluctance of doctors to refer and patients to be referred to 
private hospitals as barriers to using care purchased by the 
public sector from private hospitals.
The availability and coordination with other healthcare 
and social care services is another factor influencing the 
accessibility of hospitals. The case studies show that 
private hospitals can be less well connected to other 
healthcare providers, whereas beds in public hospitals are 
more likely to be unavailable because the convalescence 
of current patients has not been arranged.
Quality
The studies included in the literature review did not 
find a clear relationship between hospital ownership 
and the quality of care provided. Access to data about 
the performance and accessibility of private hospitals 
is a prerequisite to reforming reimbursement methods, 
carrying out quality assurance and evaluating the services 
delivered. Gaps in the data available from private hospitals 
is a recurring theme in the case studies and is also one 
of the reasons for the lack of evaluations or studies 
comparing service delivery in public and private hospitals.
While data reporting requirements are different for public 
and private hospitals in many countries (for example, 
Austria, Ireland and Romania), the drivers for higher 
quality may be common to all types of hospitals. According 
to one of the interviewees in Austria, higher patient 
expectations have led to all types of hospitals having 
facilities with a similar level of comfort and quality.
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Furthermore, there is the issue of comparability of data 
across countries which have very different healthcare 
arrangements and where private healthcare can take many 
different forms. A study comparing the quality and safety 
of hospitals in five different countries found differences in 
the indicators, data collection requirements and oversight, 
levels of aggregation and public access to data (Burnett et 
al, 2013).
Most of the information about quality found in this 
research comes from patient experience surveys, with 
mixed outcomes. Some of the factors influencing quality 
found in several case studies were the qualifications 
and experience of staff, the staff to patient ratio, and the 
equipment and facilities at the hospital.
Policy pointers
 A recurrent issue in the case studies is the transfer 
of patients from private to public hospitals when 
complications arise. If delays take place, this can 
lead to a worsening of medical conditions. Reticence 
to cooperate has led, on some occasions in Ireland, 
to patients being discharged from private hospitals 
and then being given an appointment in a public 
hospital rather than a direct referral and admission. 
Moreover, unscheduled cases create complications 
for public sector hospitals that may have to deal with 
complex cases at a short notice. A solution to this in 
some countries is to co-locate private hospitals next 
to or within public hospitals and to have agreements 
in place for these types of referrals. Another possible 
solution is to promote the treatment of whole 
episodes of care when commissioning care from 
private providers.
 A more structured type of partnership – rather than 
on-the-spot contracting – could help to build trust 
and reduce the selection of patients with fewer health 
problems, leading to a decrease in disruptive referrals 
of unscheduled complex cases to public hospitals. It 
could also make better use of the capacity available 
in private hospitals. One way to do this is to tackle the 
duplication of services, with each provider playing to 
their strengths. This could include the designation of 
private hospitals as national centres of expertise or 
services for specific treatments or diagnosis for which 
a critical mass of patients is necessary. However, this 
requires consultation with policymakers about the 
ability to meet needs that involve the private sector 
and overcoming the reticence from staff in the public 
sector to have private providers offering certain 
treatments.
 Coordinating a more diversified provision entails 
greater sharing of information about patients or staff. 
Here, the public sector can act as a broker, perhaps 
establishing a repository of information, complaints 
and good practices.
Efficiency
 There needs to be an improvement in payment 
mechanisms in order to reflect the actual costs 
incurred by hospitals. However, collating more 
refined information would increase administrative 
costs. Exchanges at the European level of experiences 
with different payment mechanisms could be useful 
to assess the problems associated with different 
payment systems. This could be done in the 
framework of the European Semester, where there 
is considerable emphasis on the cost efficiency of 
healthcare.
 DRGs are a first step towards linking payments with 
performance. When adapting DRG systems used in 
other countries, particular attention should be paid to 
this and to the incentives that the system may provide 
to create overcapacity, prioritise quantity over quality 
of care and incentivise upcoding.
 The length of stay and the accessibility of hospitals 
can be optimised by improving coordination with 
other levels of care. The availability of home and 
residential care services is particularly relevant to 
reduce the number of hospital beds occupied.
 Comparing cost efficiency in public and private 
hospitals is an area where more robust research is 
needed.
Accessibility
 Purchasing care from private hospitals to reduce 
waiting lists in public hospitals should be done 
following a cost–benefit analysis and followed by an 
evaluation of the outcomes. The underuse of care 
purchased from private hospitals can be avoided 
by changing attitudes to referrals. Charity activities, 
patient financial reviews and care package discounts 
are all useful ways of mitigating affordability issues in 
private hospitals. Tackling informal payments should 
be part of strategies aiming to make hospital care 
more affordable.
v Physical accessibility has been identified as an issue 
in several case studies, with private hospitals mostly 
located in affluent areas. This should be taken into 
consideration when coordinating public and private 
service provision and/or purchasing care from private 
hospitals.
 Overall, there is a need for more robust research 
comparing the accessibility of public and private 
services.
Quality
 The differences between countries in the development 
and implementation of quality management strategies 
raises the question of the role that the EU can play 
in fostering quality assurance. Developing European 
standards in healthcare services through the 
European Committee for Standardisation was part of 
the EU 2015 programme for European standardisation 
(European Commission, 2014). This has been 
opposed by the European Social Insurance Platform 
on the grounds of the diversity of the situation at 
national level and the subsidiarity principle (ESIP 
and AIM, 2016). Standardisation similar to ISO 9000 
has been rejected by the European Hospital and 
Healthcare Employers’ Association (HOSPEEM), 
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which advocates the development of indicators in 
collaboration with healthcare professionals. The 
development of a quality framework similar to that 
developed at EU level for social services has also not 
been recommended by the MARQuIS project, which 
concluded that it may be best to establish specific 
quality requirements at EU level for which directives 
already exist (for example, in the field of radiology, 
blood and tissues) (Groene et al, 2009). The MARQuIS 
project also highlighted the variation within countries 
of quality management strategies in hospitals, for 
which a guide with quality management indexes for 
hospitals has been developed as part of an EU project 
(Groene et al, 2014).
 Outsourcing care to private hospitals should not be 
a substitute to finding solutions to issues in public 
hospitals and it needs to be compared with other 
options. The European Commission’s EU Expert Panel 
on Effective Ways of Investing in Health highlighted 
the need to clearly define what is to be commissioned 
and to decide how to monitor costs and effects, as 
well as the need for strong commissioning bodies and 
processes. It also pointed out the need for additional 
information and regulation in order to engage private 
providers in service provision. Contracts and payment 
systems need to provide incentives for quality, 
cost-effectiveness and control of costs (European 
Commission, 2016c).
 Inspectorates in many countries do not currently 
have the capacity or the legal remit to inspect private 
hospitals. Given the increase in private provision, it 
is important to have a level playing field in terms of 
inspection.
 Diversified provision also increases the importance 
of auditing and increases the necessity to tackle 
corruption in procurement. Some initiatives that 
are effective at tackling corruption in procurement 
include: increasing the independence of the 
police and the public prosecutor; the inclusion of 
the healthcare sector in strict state procurement 
regulation, and centralising the maximum price of 
pharmaceuticals (European Commission, 2013c).
 There is a serious lack of data about quality processes 
and outcomes disaggregated by ownership, although 
nowadays there is more information provided by 
service users rating hospitals in similar ways that 
they rate other services. The lack of data about the 
quality of care in private hospitals has implications 
for the provision of cross-border care, therefore it 
is important to address these dimensions in the EU 
Joint Assessment Framework for Health and the OECD 
Health Care Quality Indicators.
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Annex: REA methodology
Search strategy
The REA (rapid evidence assessment) was primarily 
conducted in mid-August, September and the beginning 
of October 2015, although snowball sampling was carried 
out in December 2015 and January 2016. For this review, 
all the articles were made accessible in case the full text 
was needed. To safeguard quality and limit selection bias, 
a second opinion was given by a second researcher about 
the articles classed as disputable at the full text stage. 
Data management was performed using Mendeley and 
Microsoft ® Excel.
Database
Three potentially important databases were identified for 
this research question: Scopus, EconLit and SocINDEX. 
Scopus is crucial since it is one of the biggest peer-
reviewed multidisciplinary databases, with a complete 
coverage of MEDLINE® articles. EconLit is included because 
it contains all the research conducted in the field of 
economics, which is especially relevant to find articles 
on efficiency. SocINDEX was included to gain access to 
literature that might include the perspective of users. Grey 
literature or publications only in paper form were excluded 
from the literature review.
Search terms
The search terms were determined by exploring the 
research field (Table A1).
As a result of the process outlined in Table A1, two 
different search strategies were employed for the three 
different databases due to the high number of hits within 
Scopus. Scopus search string also includes keywords 
mentioning the outcome variables of interest. To justify 
this approach, different search terms were tested before 
the actual selection of the articles to provide reassurance 
on the quality and relevance of the hits.36 The search 
string included standardised Medical Subject Headings 
(MeSH) for PubMed articles. For the EconLit and SocINDEX 
databases, the search terms covered only the intervention.
Only research since 2000 and articles written in English 
were included, which could lead to the exclusion of 
relevant studies from non-English speaking countries 
but, due to the nature of the REA, concessions had to be 
made in this regard. However, the language bias is limited 
because most peer-reviewed articles in high ranking 
journals are written in English as the English language is 
perceived to be the universal language of science.
The search string excluded the term ‘United States’ before 
2008 since this review was only interested in papers related 
to EU Member States. This review accepts that this search 
term might be relevant for cross-country comparison 
studies, but the study of Eggleston et al (2008) – identified 
as one of the key systematic reviews conducted in this 
field in the USA – justifies the exclusion of the literature 
before this paper was written. Furthermore, in order to 
limit the number of hits, the review excludes all the studies 
with less than two citations before 200837 on the grounds 
that it can be assumed that these papers did not make 
a substantial contribution to the academic debate.
Table A1: Defining search terms
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Review of potential literature 
(including grey literature) and 
identification of important 
systematic literature reviews on 
the topic.
Identification of relevant 
keywords for the search strategy 
based on literature found on 
the topic as well as standard 
keyword used by the databases.
Trial run in the three databases 
with various keywords.
Assessment of which keywords 
provide useful hits and which 
do not.
Final search with the defined 
research terms.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
36 Other search terms that were analysed were: ‘commercial’, ‘outsource’, ‘contracting out’, ‘waiting time’, ‘clinical outcome’, ‘equity’ and ‘marketisation’. These search 
terms were deemed unfit, mainly because the articles found with those terms were unsuitable for this systematic review (for example, ‘equity’ primarily gave 
articles from developing countries).
37 Citations according to the databases where the articles are identified, thus Scopus, EconLit or SocINDEX.
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Review process
A flow chart (also referred to as a PRISMA flow diagram) of 
the review process is shown in Figure A1. It provides a clear 
overview of how many articles were excluded for review, at 
which stage and why. A description of the different stages 
is provided below.
Title and abstract stage: Context
This stage deviates slightly from the strict path of 
a standard systematic review, which one should start by 
screening the literature by title and then move on to the 
abstract (Booth et al, 2012). To make the first substantial 
reduction in all the papers (especially because of the 
number of hits in Scopus), the first exclusion was based 
on one geographical area. In terms of the PICOS elements 
(Booth et al, 2012, p. 56), it is the ‘context’ that is excluded 
(the countries). Thus all the papers conducted in all non-
EU countries were refused based on title or abstract; if 
uncertainty remained, the decision was made based on 
the affiliation of the researcher(s) or on keywords such 
as Medicare or US veterans. Papers that only executed 
economic modelling without using any data from 
a specific context where also excluded.
Title and abstract stage: PICOS criteria
For the second stage, papers were excluded by matching 
them with the design (PICOS) criteria, looking solely at 
the title and abstract of the articles. PICOS was preferred 
over PICO (population, intervention, comparators and 
outcomes) because it was undesirable to include those 
articles that were clearly not empirical, for example, 
a descriptive analysis of policy reforms. In addition, 
articles that had an abstract in English but the body of the 
article was written in a different language were excluded at 
this stage.
Figure A1: PRISMA flow diagram
Total hits:
Scopus = 1,244, EconLit = 115
SocINDEX = 56
Backward and forward
snowballing
Total number of articles in review: 19 Total number of articles in review: 11
Excluded = 1,184
Backward: 75 selected based
on title and abstract
Forward: 527 hits
Excluded based on context
– non EU Member States
title and abstract
Selection using PICOS elements:
title and abstract
Selected for full text
Excluded = 139
Up for appraisal
Selection using PICOS elements:
full text Excluded = 52
Backward: 19
Forward: 18
Duplicates = 11
Backward: 19
Forward: 18
Appraised based on criteria
set out in Annex Excluded = 21
Notes: Percentages calculated over the total included in the previous stage.
 PICOS = Population, Intervention, Comparators, Outcomes and Study
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
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Full text stage: PICOS criteria
This stage is similar to the previous one. The only 
difference being that the full text of the article is utilised 
to determine whether the sources really fulfil the criteria 
outlined in Table A2. The majority of the papers were from 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK. At this stage, articles 
that based their research on datasets before 2000 were 
excluded for further review,38 since more recent findings 
are more likely to be relevant for the contemporary 
context. Articles that were disputable were discussed 
between the two researchers and based on consensus they 
were either included or excluded for the appraisal stage.
Critical appraisal stage
In the appraisal stage, 40 articles were assessed using 
a standard format to appraise the quality of the studies, 
with 19 articles found to be suitable for the synthesis. 
The review follows realistic review rationale that a strict 
hierarchical approach (for example, the Maryland 
Scientific Methods Scale) is not suitable in this regard. The 
majority of articles were from France, Germany, Italy and 
the UK.
The criteria for exclusion in the appraisal stage were:
 clear signs of conflict of interest, for example, when 
the author was affiliated to one of the hospitals where 
the study was carried out;
 research designs considered to be (extremely) weak;
 evidence that uses robustness checks, such as 
a ‘bootstrapping’ procedure by data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), outlier detection and/or or included 
case-mix weights, are perceived to be high quality 
studies. For the efficiency measure, DEA should 
include a two stage analysis; no comparison with 
public hospitals (articles that compared non-profit 
hospitals with for-profit hospitals were therefore 
considered ineligible);
 poor reporting on the dataset and methodology in so 
far that no critical appraisal was possible.
Snowballing stage + expert referral
A snowballing technique was carried out to include 
more relevant articles. Both forward snowballing39 and 
backward snowballing40 of the 19 articles selected in 
the systematic search were carried out. In addition, the 
literature selected in other systematic reviews covering the 
EU (Hollingsworth, 2003; Hanratty et al, 2007; Sibbel and 
Nagarajah, 2012; Tiemann et al, 2012; Torchia et al, 2013) 
were considered.
The snowballing methodology has been used previously – 
under Cochrane Review standards (Hayes et al, 2012) – and 
the technique has been assessed as a successful addition 
to a systematic review by Greenhalgh and Peacock (2005) 
as well as by advocates for realist reviews (Pawson et al, 
2005).
The articles considered to be useful, based on the PICOS 
criteria, were appraised using the same process as the 
articles identified using the search string. A total of 10 
articles were selected throughout this process.
After an expert workshop held in November 2015, 
a request was issued to refer relevant articles that might 
have been missed in the review process. Only one of the 
articles submitted was deemed suitable for inclusion 
(Pappa and Niakas, 2006), giving a total of 11 from 
processes other than the systematic search.
Table A2: Exclusion criteria for the second phase
Population The population is private hospitals, which could be non-profit, for-profit or public–private 
partnership (PPP) hospital. Papers that include private hospitals as a control variable are also 
considered to be eligible.
Intervention/exposure Exposure refers to patients’ exposure to the service delivery of private hospitals; an assessment 
should also be made on their delivery of healthcare. Privatisation is interpreted as an intervention.
Comparison A comparison should be made with a public hospital(s) or national/regional average.
Outcome At least one of the following elements should be covered: efficiency, quality of healthcare and 
accessibility. It is important to note that articles that include employment effects are not considered 
unless there is a direct link with efficiency, accessibility and quality of care.
Study design The focus of this study is on empirical research, so no descriptive papers or economic modelling are 
included.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the descriptions given above.
38 When longitudinal data were used, articles were excluded when the last wave was older than the year 1999.
39 Forward snowballing identifies articles that refer to the selected articles in the REA. This was done with Google Scholar since it includes a broad scope of articles 
from the different databases that cited the article.
40 Backward snowballing means that the articles referred to in the selected articles in the review are identified.
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